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INTRODUCTION
In recent years alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") has moved from the
margins of legal practice into the mainstream.' It is no longer the exception for
1. For example, the number of federal district courts employing ADR programs grew from a single district
court in 1980 to more than half of all federal district courts in 1996. See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 580-82 (1997). Indeed,
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 ("ADRA"), 28 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq. (West 1998) (enacted to
amend the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (West 1998)), requires all federal district
courts to establish an ADR program, making at least one form of ADR available to all federal civil litigants. See,
e.g., The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate Disputes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S.
Corporations (Comell/PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution, 1998) [hereinafter Cornell/PERC]. See also
David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Top General Counsels Support ADR: Fortune 1000 Lawyers Comment on
its Status and Future, 8:4 Bus. LAW TODAY 24 (March/April 1999); Divonne Smoyer, Good News: Talk Is
Cheap, Bus. LEGAL TIMES 538 (Feb. 22, 1999) (eighty seven percent of Fortune 1000 corporate counsels
surveyed worked for corporations that had used mediation in the last three years); Dana N. Freyer, Integrating
ADR: A Matter of Legal Practice, 51 DisP. RESOL. J. 47, 49-50 (April 1996) (discussing 1994 studies of
Massachusetts law firms, one conducted by the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution which found that sixty five
percent of the firms surveyed had already implemented ADR services into their practices); Senator Howell
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attorneys to employ or clients to request ADR services in almost every aspect of
legal representation.2 This shift to the legal mainstream raises the question
whether attorneys, as part of their general obligation to keep clients informed of
their legal alternatives, should be required to advise their clients regarding ADR
options. This paper will consider this question. In doing so, it will consider, at
least inferentially, the character and purpose of ethics "rules."-
3
Consideration of the issue begins with four relevant Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, which is the operative "model" text for state ethics rules.
4
1) Model Rule 1.2(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued (emphasis added)." 5
2) Model Rule 1.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.",
6
Heflin, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Guarantee our Justice System Works, (Speech before the Section of
Dispute Resolution, ABA), in 23:63 VrrAL SPEEcHEs 709 (Sept. 15, 1997) (citing a 1996 Deloitte and Touche
survey of "general counsels and outside attorneys [which] indicated ... a twenty eight percent jump" in the use
of ADR by Fortune 1000 companies over a three year period).
2. The proliferation of recent ADR initiatives is remarkable. For some disparate examples, note that: In 1998
the Federal Energy Regulation Commission ordered Independent System Operators to adopt ADR measures.
See California Power Industry Opts for ADR, 53 Disp. RESOL. J. 7 (May 1998). A "virtual cottage industry"
supporting alternative dispute resolution in environmental cases has developed. See Peter L. Winik & Michael P.
Vandenberg, Environmentally Sound, 19:18 LEGAL TIMES S40 (Sept. 16, 1996). ADR increasingly is being used
to resolve disputes about responsibility for the cleanup costs of hazardous waste contamination. Numerous
corporations including Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Motorola Inc. have set up "in-house" ADR programs.
See Laurel-Ann Dooley, Moving from Arbitration to Negotiation: Companies Find Informal Dispute Resolution
is Best, 21:3 NAT'L L.J., BI (Sept. 14, 1998). In Delaware, the governor signed the Delaware Voluntary
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act into law which allows business parties to "agree, prior to any disputes
arising between them, to utilize alternative dispute resolution techniques if a dispute occurs." See Governor
Signs Bill: Delaware Pushes ADR for Business, 50 Dtsp. RESOL. J. 5 (1995).
3. See infra text relating to notes 16-20.
4. Forty one states have adopted the Model Rules as of 1999. See Law, Manual on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 01:3 to 01:4 (1999).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(a) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RuLES]. Compare
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrrY EC 7-7 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("In certain areas of
legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a
lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively
that of the client... [for example,] it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer .... ").
See also Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 41, 65-67 (1979).
The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility has established the Ethics 2000 Commission to examine
proposed amendments to the existing Model Rules, as well as newly proposed rules. A list of the rules to be
considered and a description of the issues involved is available at the ABA web site. ABA, (visited February 1,
2000) <http://www.abanet.org /cpr/wkpliss.html>. The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission intends to examine
Model Rule 1.2(a). See id.
6. MODEL RLES Rule 1.4. Compare MODEL CODE EC 7-8 ("A lawyer should exert his best efforts to ensure
that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations." and "A
lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative.") Id. See also Robert F. Cochran,
Jr., Must Lawyers Tell Clients About ADR?, 48 ARB. J. 8, 8 (June 1993). Again, the Restatement contains a
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3) Model Rule 3.2 provides that "[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.",
7
4) Finally, Model Rule 2.1 provides that "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgement and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation." 8
As the above texts make clear, the Model Rules do not provide explicit
guidance regarding the mandatory quality of an ADR requirement.9 For many,
however, the language of the Model Rules creates an implicit obligation to advise
a client regarding ADR options.1° After all, the Model Rules require that an
attorney "consult with the client" to "explain a matter," to expedite litigation and
to "render candid advice" on relevant matters, all seemingly consonant with the
duty to consult with a client regarding ADR options."
In contrast, some have opposed mandatory ADR disclosure by arguing that it
similar injunction. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 31(3) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
March 29, 1996).
7. MODEL RULES Rule 3.2 (1983). See also STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 1998, 20 (Aspen 1997) (noting that some attorneys believe that it is at least arguable
that Model Rule 3.2 includes a duty to inform a client regarding alternatives to litigation) [hereinafter GILLERS].
8. MODEL RULES Rule 2.1. "In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client ....
A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has
indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's
interest." MODEL RULES Rule 2.1 cmt. 5. Colorado and Hawaii have adopted modified versions of Model Rule
2.1. "In a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer should advise the client of alternative
forms of dispute resolution which might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach
the legal objective sought (emphasis added)." See COLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 2.1; HAW. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 2.1. Delaware and New Mexico have adopted similar language. See DEL. SOp. CT. R.
7 1(B) (Del. State Bar Ass'n Statement of Principles of Lawyer Conduct); N.M. R. LAW. CREED. (A Lawyer's
Creed of Professionalism of the State Bar of New Mexico). Compare MODEL CODE EC 7-8. ("In the final
analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decisions whether to forego legally available
objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself."). See also
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOvERNiNG LAWYERS § 31 cmt. (Proposed Final Draft No.1, March 29, 1996)
("A lawyer should not necessarily assume that a client wishes to press all the client's rights to the limit,
regardless of the cost or impact on others." In addition to legal considerations, advice properly may include
economic, social, political, and moral implications.).
In recent revisions to Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Virginia State Bar included in Comment 2
to Rule 2.1 the following guidance: "Purely technical legal advice ... can sometimes be inadequate. It could
also ignore, to the client's disadvantage, the relational or emotional factors driving a dispute. In such a case,
advice may include the advantages, disadvantages and availability of other dispute resolution processes that
might be appropriate under the circumstances (emphasis added)." Virginia State Bar (visited September 1999)
<http://www.vsb.org>.
9. See, e.g., Honorable Robert J. Robertory, 1:10 ADR Report 1 (P & F) (Sept. 17, 1997).
10. See, e.g., Monica L. Warmbrod, Could an Attorney Face Disciplinary Actions or Even Legal Malpractice
Liability for Failure to Inform Clients of Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 27 CuMa. L. REv. 791, 813-17
(1996-1997); Carol VanAuken-Haight & Pamela Chapman Enseln, Attorney Duty to Inform Clients of ADR, 71
MICH. Bus. L.J. 1038, 1038 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander, Should There be a Duty to Advise of ADR Options? Yes: An Aid to Clients,
76 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (November 1990).
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results in unnecessary client expense. 12 "Such a rule would increase greatly
malpractice liability and run up the meter on client expenses" suggests New
Jersey lawyer, Michael L. Prigoff. 13 Thus, he argues that in "small disputes" it is
"counter productive to the goal of providing more satisfactory dispute resolution
at an affordable price." 14 Such proposals, Prigoff concludes, are "overkill and
unfair micro-management of the practice of law."' 5
More broadly, others have expressed that rules for ethical responsibilities are
generally inflexible and do not capture real world complexities. 1 6 Unlike unen-
forceable standards, it is said that this inflexibility manifests itself when lawyers,
in fear of punishment, are deterred from exercising their own consciences and
instead seek the safety of the precise letter of the law.' 7 From this perspective,
statutory rules deprive lawyers of recourse to their own consciences and thus lead
to action that may be incompatible with the promotion of ethical judgment. 18 In
the context of ADR, this means that promoting consultation would best be
accomplished by structuring a standard that allows an attorney a certain amount
of discretion in deciding the appropriateness of consultation.
The underlying assumption here is that the power of a rule rests primarily in its
ability to sever an actor from the exercise of personal judgment. This assumption
overlooks the fact that an undeniable effect of a rule is to establish norms that
shape our surroundings and mold our consciences. 19 Thus, the power of a rule is
not necessarily its ability to detach attorneys from their consciences and immerse
them in abstract law. In fact, the power of a rule may lie in its ability to inform
conscience through the public validation of desirable norms.2 ° Thus, establishing
12. Michael L. Prigoff, Should There be a Duty to Advise ofADR Options? No: An Unreasonable Burden, 76
A.B.A. J. 51, 51 (Nov. 1990).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1083-1145 (1988)
(arguing that when the legal community insists upon conventional rules of ethics, lawyers are forced to follow
rigid rules "that dictate a particular response in the presence of a small number of factors. The decision-maker
has no discretion to consider factors she encounters that are not specified or to evaluate specified factors in any
way other than that given in the rule."). See id. at 1086.
17. See Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80
IOWA L. REv. 901 (1995). Strassberg asserts that "positivist driven formalism constrains interpretive choices
and strategies for avoiding morally undesirable consequences." Id. at 903. For further arguments about how
strict positivist law undermines moral behavior, see also Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CI. L.
REv. 14, 14-46 (1967); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630, 630-672 (1958).
18. See Strassberg, supra note 17, at 903.
19. See Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice, 57-59 (1997) (In part, arguing that there exists an
"expressive function of law" which has the effect of "expressing social values and in encouraging social norms
to move in particular directions.").
20. See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the
Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936,936-78 (1991). Pildes argues that "implicit in all public policy programs and
institutions are norms that inform their design and aim. By expressing and embodying such norms, policy
outcomes necessarily consecrate certain values and exclude others. The public validation of certain norms
2000]
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a mandatory ADR consultation rule is only in part an attempt to dispense with the
role of attorney discretion. It is also an attempt to establish norms and values that
will subtly but surely provide the context for the use of that discretion.
I. WHAT IS ADR FOR THESE PURPOSES?
One of the problems with creating a specific ADR obligation is the difficulty in
articulating a precise definition of the term "ADR." As long as ADR existed as an
experimental or supplemental tool to litigation, strict classification of which
activity did and did not fall within its ambit was unnecessary, and even
counterproductive, 2' to the concept's development.2 2
An explicit requirement of ADR consultation will inevitably require a "canoni-
zation" of ADR techniques. While this may be a balm to many ADR enthusiasts,
it will, as a consequence, leave many experimental procedures outside of the
canon. Are we ready for the reduction of the flexibility and experimentation that
inevitably accompanies the classification of what is and is not an officially
recognized ADR practice? 23 The question of canonization must be answered
before one can support any consultative duty.
Efforts have been made to overextend the concept of ADR to encompass an
attorney obligation to attempt to settle litigation whenever possible. 24 As one
court has suggested, "lawyers not only owe allegiance to their clients, but have a
duty to spare the courts from unnecessary litigation" and should serve as
contributes to a broader political culture characterized by those particular understandings and commitments."
Id. at 941. Pildes goes on to argue that this "broader political culture" serves as the context for individual and
collective decision making. Id.
21. In another context I have written that parties using ADR could "shape procedures to meet their needs on
a case by case basis." Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearings on H.R. 2497 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 66 (1990)
(statement of Marshall J. Breger). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes
of its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Resolution Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1890 (1997) (suggesting
that if ADR is to work, mediators and parties will just have "to be more open, candid, creative, and
solution-seeking").
22. As is by now well known, there are at least four basic types of ADR methods. (1) Arbitration is the most
commonly used and is established by a contract between the parties. (2) Mediation involves the use of a neutral
third party who helps the parties reach an agreement. Parties involved in this type of proceeding are not limited
by contract terms nor are they bound by the mediator's decision. (3) Mini-trials are faux proceedings conducted
with the supervision of a "settlement" judge. The benefit of a mini-trial is that it allows both parties to gain a
clear perspective of each sides? strengths and weaknesses. (4) "Rent a judge" is an ADR method in which the
parties agree to abide by the results rendered by a referee, typically a retired judge. Within this broad
framework, there is substantial experimentation, including such mechanisms as "med-arb," "last best chance
arbitration" and "proactive mediation." See generally ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER, ALTERNATIVES TO LInGATION:
MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND THE ART OF DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 14 (1993).
23. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, "Wait a minute. This is where I came in. "A Trial Lawyer's Search for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 653,665 (1997) (arguing that "court annexation of ADR is
bad for the ADR movement" because "ADR will lose its unique character, and with it, its value to a society
already too adversarial for its own good").
24. MODEL RULES Rule 3.2.
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gatekeepers to the legal process by diverting claims into mediative channels
rather than translating them into adversary claims. z5 This independent duty to
settle has been used to deny statutory attorney fees in litigation where the
defendant was prepared to settle before a suit was filed, thus making "the filing of
suit ... unnecessary to the ultimate result obtained.", 26 Failure to discuss
settlement with a client is a violation of many ethics codes27 and has been used to
support malpractice claims as well.28
One might well tease out a duty to attempt appropriate ADR solutions from the
duty to attempt settlement. Thus, any operative definition of ADR for consulta-
tion purposes must consider the extent to which ADR is analytically separate
from settlement negotiations and whether that distinction has any meaning in
considering an ADR consultation requirement. Indeed, many ADR casebooks
include chapters on settlement negotiation techniques.29 Certainly there will be
the temptation for many attorneys to sweep settlement within the ambit of ADR
and claim to have met any consultation obligation through consultation with their
client over settlement offers.
Having said this, I believe it important to hive off the settlement process from
the ADR process and to view them as two separate processes. Settlement is drawn
from an adversary paradigm; you have to begin formal litigation before you can
settle. The ADR process, in theory, requires one to shuck the adversary paradigm
to be successful. Thus, the duty to make a good faith effort to settle should not
serve as the underpinning of any ADR consultation duty.
II. DOES SUCH A RULE OF CONSULTATION ALREADY EXIST?
3 0
Read literally, neither Model Rule 1.2 or 1.4(b) even mentions ADR. Model
Rule 1.2 requires that attorneys consult as to "means" and Model Rule 1.4(b)
provides only that "a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
25. Jackson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 858 F Supp. 464,472 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
26. Greenside v. Ariyoshi, 526 F Supp. 1194, 1197 (D. Haw. 1981). See also Naprstek v. Norwich, 433 F
Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
27. See, e.g., KAN. ETHics CODE (1999).
28. See, e.g., Garris v. Severson, 252 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (order not published). This opinion
is binding upon the parties, but may not be used in California courts as precedent. VanAuken-Haight and Enseln,
supra note 10, at 1039 n. 12. It has been suggested that this case may be the "camel's nose under the tent flap,"
indicating "that an attorney's duty to explore settlement options encompasses a duty to inform the client of
various means of settlement, including ADR." Id. at n.7.
29. See, e.g., WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES
FOR LAW AND BusNEss 1045-1103 (1996); JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DIsPuTE RESOLUTnON: THE
ROLE OF LAWYER 192-292 (2d ed. 1996).
30. Professor Frank E.A. Sander, one of the earliest pioneers of ADR, would answer yes to this question. See
generally Sander, supra note 11, at 50. It may be argued that the fiduciary duties owed by an agent-attorney to
his principal-client encompass the duty to "identify and protect the client's interests." Such a duty may include
alternatives to litigation. For an informative article discussing the principles of agency involved in attorney
relationships, including duties owed to the client, the court, the self-regulating profession and third parties, see
Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 301-11 (1998).
2000]
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necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the represen-
tation."'', Reading "reasonably necessary" broadly, this rule may be construed as
containing an inherent obligation for an attorney to provide an explanation of
ADR processes sufficient to enable a client to make an "informed decision" as to
whether to pursue ADR. Some commentators have suggested that a reasonable
reading of state rules based on Model Rule 1.4 reveals such an implicit duty.32
Besides reading Model Rule 1.4(b) broadly, an ADR obligation can often be
inferred by referring to legal sources outside of the rules of professional conduct.
For example, under the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Disciplinary
Rule 1.4 reads that attorneys have a duty to "keep clients reasonably informed
about the status of a matter." 33 As in the case of the Model Rules, enforcement of
this rule relies upon the meaning of "reasonably informed." It has been argued
that in light of the Louisiana Mediation Act,34 enacted to encourage the use of
ADR, the "reasonably informed" language of rule 1.4 should be read as
including an obligation for attorneys to discuss ADR options with their clients.
35
Model Rule 2.1 provides a different approach than rules 1.2 or 1.4(b). It requires
that an attorney should render "candid advice," directing an attorney not only to
consider legal, but also "moral, economic, social and political factors" that may
impact the outcome of a client's dispute.36 If such "candid advice" includes a
discussion regarding ADR options, then attorneys will have an affirmative
obligation to discuss ADR options for a wide variety of reasons beyond the
technically "legal." States such as Colorado, 37 Hawaii38 and Georgia 39 have
taken this a step further to include the specific recommendation that an attorney
31. MODEL RULES Rule 1.4(b). See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS S. JUD. CT. R. ch. 3 ("There will be
circumstances in which a lawyer should advise a client concerning the advantages and disadvantages of
available dispute resolution options in order to permit the client to make informed decisions concerning the
representation."); N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain the legal and
practical aspects of a matter and alternative courses of action to the extent that such explanation is reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding representation.").
32. In some states like Florida "the issue has not yet been decided." Robert Jarvis, Arbitration Ethics sec.
D(2) in THE FLORIDA BAR, ALTERNATE DISPUTrE RESOLUTION IN FLORIDA. Nonetheless, this leading commentator
suggests that "prudence dictates that Florida advocates tell their clients about arbitration as well as other
extra-judicial dispute systems." Id.
33. LA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT D.R. 1.4(a).
34. LA. RS. 9:4101 -4112.
35. See Bobby Marzine Harges, Blueprintfor Effective ADR, 46 LA. B.J. 100, 101 (Aug. 1998).
36. MODEL RULES Rule 2.1.
37. See COLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1. ("In a matter involving or expected to involve
litigation, a lawyer should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute resolution which might reasonably be
pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective sought."). See also Steve C.
Briggs, ADR in Colorado: Past and Present, COLO. LAW. 103 (June 26, 1997) (discussing the development of
ADR in Colorado); Edward A. Dauer & Cythia McNeill, New Rules on ADR: Professional Ethics, Shotguns and
Fish, COLO. LAW. (Sept. 1992).
38. See HAW. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1. ("In a matter involving or expected to involve
litigation, a lawyer should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute resolution which might reasonably be
pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective sought.").
39. See GA. R. C.P.R. EC 7-5.
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consider alternative dispute resolution, in addition to these other consider-
ations.4 °
As clients are clearly the best interpreters of their "non-legal" interests, the
proportion of disputes for which ADR consultation should be required has
become exceedingly large. Thus, this analysis suggests that allowing an attorney
to make the ADR decision for the client takes away the control over aspects of the
case that should rightfully be in the client's hands.4
Even if one does not accept that a duty of consultation can be derived from a
reading of Model Rules 1.4(b) or 2.4, it is possible to cobble together support
from other textual sources for an existing rule of consultation. One may, as an
example, treat an offer to pursue ADR as any other settlement offer and base the
purported consultation requirement on Model Rule 1.4(b).4 2 Such an offer must
be communicated to the client.4 3 Thus, a Kansas Bar Opinion states that "[i]f an
ADR technique is proposed by opposing counsel or the court, the lawyer must
advise the lawyer' client of the benefits and disadvantages of the ADR tech-
niques proposed, and give the lawyer's professional advice to the client regarding
use of the ADR in the particular case. '"4 The State Bars of Michigan 45 and
Pennsylvania46 adhere to a similar position.47
40. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 188. See also VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 2.1 cmt.
2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1999); GA. R. U.S.D.C.T.M.D. STANDARDS OF CONDUCr § B(10)(c) ("In every case,
a lawyer should consider, and discuss with his client, whether the client's interest could be adequately served
and the controversy more expeditiously and economically disposed of by arbitration, mediation or other forms
of alternative dispute resolution.").
41. Mark Spiegel suggests that the "subject-matter/procedure line" helps to delineate this responsibility and
autonomy, admittedly not clear, by establishing "affirmative obligations" in certain instances, for example,
when a conflict of interest arises. Spiegel, supra note 5, at 64. "Absent such circumstances, the burden of
initiating consultation between attorney and client falls upon the client. In most instances, therefore, the lawyer
may act upon his own judgment unless the client instructs otherwise." Id. at 64-65.
42. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21, at 1886 (raising this recently developing issue).
43. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58 (Pa. 1989) (failure to communicate a settlement offer to a client is
malpractice). Recently the Maryland Court of Appeals established liability in a case where an attorney
negligently advised a client to accept an "inadequate" offer of settlement. See Steve France, Giving Up the
Fight: Maryland Joins about a Dozen States Holding Lawyers Liable for Bad Settlement Recommendations,
A.B.A. J. 28 (Feb. 1999).
44. Kan. Bar Ass'n, Professional Ethics -Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 94-01 (April 15, 1994) (referring
to Model Rules 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4).
45. State Bar of Mich., Standing Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-255 (1996) (referring to
Model Rules 1.2(a), 1.4 and 2.1). "By offering to settle the dispute through means other than the public forum of
trial, the proposal is akin to an offer of settlement which must be conveyed to the client." Id. See generally
Thomas D. Dyze, ADR 's Impact on the Resolution of Cases in the Michigan Federal Courts, 74 MICH. B.J. 654
(July 1995).
46. Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 90-125 (1991)
(referring to Model Rules 1.2(a), 1.4, 1.7 and 3.2). "If the lawyer fails to convey the mediation proposed to the
client, he may not charge the client the expense of trial preparation if these expenses are incurred as a result of
the lawyer's failure to communicate the offer." Id. See also Arthur Garwin, Show Me the Offer: When Opposing
Counsel Suggests Mediation, Your Client Needs to Know, 83 A.B.A. J. 84 (June 1997) (discussing same).
47. As does Washington, D.C., where the Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(c) provide that "[a] lawyer
who receives an offer of settlement in a civil case... shall inform the client promptly of the substance of the
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Following this view, the State Bar of Virginia proposed a revised version of the
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. Proposed Rule 1.4(c) provides, that "[a]
lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communica-
tions from another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution of
the matter.",48 Driving home this specific point, Comment 1(a) to proposed Rule
1.4 explicitly provides that "[t]his continuing duty to keep the client informed
includes a duty to advise the client about the availability of dispute resolution
processes that might be more appropriate to the client's goals than the initial
process chosen. ,
4 9
Further, Model Rule 3.2 underscores the attorney's duty to expedite the
resolution of disputes. While arbitration can often be costly and time consuming,
other forms of alternate dispute resolution, such as mediation, almost certainly
save time, if not money. For the client to guide the attorney on these efficiency
issues, he must be knowledgeable regarding ADR options.
III. EVEN IF THE CLIENT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE ADVISED OF ADR,
DOES HE MAKE THE CHOICE OR DOES THE ATTORNEY?
The professional codes governing attorneys attempt to define the line between
the client and attorney decision-making authority in terms of "ends" and
"means." The client is to choose the ends of representation and the attorney is to
choose the means to pursue that end. There is no doubt that the ends/means line is
in many respects unclear.50
communication." D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.4(c). See also Ohio S. Ct. App. V (Statement
on Professionalism, A Lawyer's Creed, and A Lawyer's Aspirational Ideals) ("I shall counsel you with respect
,to alternative methods to resolve disputes.").
48. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CotNOUcT Rule 1.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1999). Additionally, Comment
I to proposed Rule 1.4 provides that "[t]he client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently
in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to
the extent the client is willing and able to do so." Comment 2 to proposed Rule 1.4 provides that "[aldequacy of
communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance involved .... The guiding principle is that
the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the
client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation." See id.
[hereinafter VA. RULES Rule 1.4 (Proposed)].
49. VA. RULES Rule 1.4 cmt. la. The Kansas Bar goes even further, requiring that an attorney raise ADR
options with the client if he deems it professionally appropriate, "whether or not the issue is raised by opposing
counsel." Kan. Bar Ass'n, Professional Ethics - Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 94-01 (April 15, 1994)
(referring to Model Rules 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4). "When the lawyer?s professional judgement indicates ADR is a
viable option, the lawyer should discuss that option with the client, whether or not the issue is raised by
opposing counsel or court." Id.
50. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps toward Client Control: Attorney
Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 819, 826-28 (1990). Cochran points out that the difficulty of identifying a decision as
either an ends or means decision is best illustrated by cases in which one court has identified a decision as an
ends decision for the attorney while another court has identified the same decision as a means decision for the
client. Id. at 827 (citing to Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780 (1962); Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall
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This ends/means problem is apparent in Model Rule 1.2. 5 1 It has been
suggested that this rule gives the client the right to information about ADR, but
does not give the client the right to decide whether to pursue it.52 Thus, Robert
Cochran intimates that "the courts will label the decision to pursue ADR a
"means" decision, rather than an "objectives" decision.",5 3 Cochran's statement
implies that the rule simply requires an attorney to consult with the client
concerning ADR.
This view is buttressed by the concept of "craft" values and "craft" stan-
dards.54 On this view, it is the attorney's expertise that is the basis for professional
autonomy.55 While the client certainly has control of the ends of a litigation, the
means must be left to the attorney's professional judgment. Such a "craft"
standard, Mark Spiegel suggests, "lies in the integrity of one's work and one's
reputation.", 56 For example, a strategic decision whether to raise ADR prior to
trial or during discovery or at all would be left to the attorney in his professional
judgment.
Co., 235 Cal. App. 2d 485 (1965)). Indeed, even the Comment to Model Rule 1.2 states: "A clear distinction
between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship
partakes of ajoint undertaking." MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. 1. The American Law Institute Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, a codification of the attorney client relation contains similar language. See
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 31 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). See generally David
C. Little, The Potential Impact of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, COLO. LAW. 83 (Sept.
1996).
51. One example is that in 1992, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC)
received 802 charges of incompetence with Rules 1.2 and 1.4. The vast majority raised issues of new
communication (Rule 1.4). There is no breakdown as to whether any of these claims pertain to ADR. See Stuart
Widman, ADR and Lawyer's Ethics, 82 ILL. B.J. 150, 151 (1994)
52. A more "client-centered" approach would "call on the lawyer to allow and indeed to press the client to
make the central decisions about his case." See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717
(1987). See generally David Binder & Susan Price, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (1977).
53. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 9.
54. See Camille A. Gear, Note: The Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics
Scholarship, 107 YALE L.J. 2473, 2473 nn. 1-3 (1998). See also Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism
and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (1995) (examining "the tension between client orientation
and professionalism" and concluding that ethics rules carve room for lawyers to exercise discretion, however,
"the rules, legal training and custom fail to emphasize adequately the lawyer's duty to act objectively");
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 295 (1993) (describing
the craft of law as "demanding a cultivated subtlety ofjudgment whose possession constitutes a valuable trait of
character, as distinct from mere technical skill, and which therefore justifies the special sort of pride that the
possession of such a trait affords").
55. See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger, Indeterminacy and Craft in Judicial Review of Administrative Law: A
Comment on Shapiro and Levy, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 109, 110 (1995) (discussing craft norms employed by
judges in administrative law cases).
56. Spiegel, supra note 5, at 128. Arguably this leaves a large amount of discretion to an attorney, with ample
room for abuse. Id. For example, an attorney may favor litigation over mediation. However, an attorney will
likely have a greater craft interest where the decision-making involves his "performance." Id. at 129. But see
Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.C.
L. REv. 315, 315-16, 324 (1987) (arguing that the traditional allocation, the "means-ends distinction" is a "false
dichotomy" which should be re-allocated to shift more authority to the client).
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In sharp contrast to this approach is the principle of client autonomy.57
Ironically, although an attorney is in the position of "protect[ing] the client's
autonomy from interference by the state and other individuals," he himself may
specifically interfere and limit his client's decision-making abilities and au-
tonomy by not providing his client with available options.58 To maintain that
autonomy, or "right of self-determination," the client should be permitted to
retain control, not only because of his "interest in autonomy," but because he "is
likely to improve the quality of legal representation" that he will receive.59 This
requires that a client be an informed client.6 °
The Comment to Model Rule 1.2, however, states that the attorney should defer
to the client when it comes to questions involving the expenses to be incurred and
the adverse impact on third parties caused by litigation.61 Certainly, the determi-
nation of whether to select ADR will, in part, reflect issues of client economics
and may, in many instances, radically affect third party relationships. Given these
factors it is hard to imagine the decision to opt for ADR as the attorney's alone.
It must be admitted that the courts have been unclear regarding the extent to
which "process choices",62 such as the ADR decision are "substantive" decisions
or simply reflect a choice of a "private forum" for private justice. The recent
judicial "revolution" federalizing arbitration law treated the choice between
arbitration and litigation as essentially procedural and certainly not one which
57. Model Rule 1.2(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." MODEL RuLES Rule 1.2.
See also Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.J. 467, 471
(Spring 1992) (discussing autonomy as part of the "core of basic rights that recognize and protect the dignity of
the individual in a free society").
58. Cochran, supra note 50, at 830.
59. See Cochran, supra note 50, at 822-23. Along these lines, the Hawaii State Bar provides a wealth of
information regarding ADR in general, with which a client may arm himself, including a list of questions to ask
his attorney regarding ADR. See Questions to Ask Your Lawyer About ADR (visited Sept. 28, 1999)
<http://hsba.org/ADR/questions.htm>.
60. See Cochran, supra note 50, at 822-23. Authors Schaffer and Cochran propose four models of
distribution of authority in the attorney-client relationship. See THOMAS L. SCHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN,
JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND MORAL REsPONSIBILrrY 3, 4 (1994). The first model is that of attorney as
"Godfather." Id. at 5. Under this model, the client relinquishes all control to the attorney, reflecting elements of
paternalism and partisan representation. Id. at 5-14. The second model is the attorney as "hired gun." Id. at 15.
Under this model the attorney provides "client-centered" counseling, which allows for client autonomy, and the
client is thus empowered. Id. at 15-17. The third model is the attorney as "guru" or what has been traditionally
called a "gentleman-lawyer." Id. at 30-32. Under this model the attorney takes on the task of actually telling the
client what he ought to do. In doing so, he takes into account the morality of decision making, thereby ensuring
responsibility, and justice in turn. Id. at 31. The fourth and final model is the attorney as friend. Id. at 40. Under
this model the attorney takes on the role of a "true advocate," in other words, looking out for more than a
financial gain, and seeking to resolve disputes while preserving relationships. Id. at 42. The attorney also seeks
to involve the client in wrestling with issues, raising moral issues, while refraining from imposing his own
moral values on his client. Id. at 43.
61. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.2 cmt. 1.
62. I borrow the term "process choices" from Carrie Menkel-Meadow. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21,
at 1919 n.227.
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"cut off" substantive rights. Thus, courts have determined that pre-dispute
arbitration agreements can be used as a surrogate to the court system to vindicate
statutory rights such as those under the Sherman Act,63 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)64 or Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act. 65 The
general position of these cases is that: "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral setting not a judicial forum.
' 66
On this view of arbitration as little more than a procedural choice between
forums, the need for client disclosure may be somewhat reduced. Nonetheless, in
the last few years, courts have begun to recognize that there is a difference
between courts and-arbitration procedures and that while some arbitrations may
capture the due process protection of a court proceeding, the two are in no way
equivalent. 67 Thus, they have begun to require elements of due process and a
significant indicia of consent before affirming mandatory arbitral forums.68 This
approach accepts implicitly at least, that the decision to arbitrate has substantive
connotations.
IV. WHAT EXACTLY DOES THE ATTORNEY'S DUTY TO ADVISE CLIENTS OF ADR
OPTIONS ENCOMPASS?
The duty to consult with a client concerning ADR options may be understood
in two ways: a "hard" sense, in which an attorney is required to analyze the case
at hand and recommend an option to his client,69 or, a "weak" sense, in which he
must simply inform his client that ADR is an option that the client may wish to
explore.7 °
Under the "hard" sense, analyzing and explaining all of the ADR options
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-32 (1967). See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate / Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
65. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1967).
66. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 626.
69. See Omo STARK Cn'. LR 16.03 (1998) ("Before the initial pre-trial conference in a case, counsel shall
discuss the appropriateness of ADR in the litigation with their clients and with opposing counsel."); U.S.D.C.
S.D. TX D.L.R. 20(A)(1) (1999) (same text as Ohio Gen. R. 16.03); Sacramento Super. & Municipal Ct. L.R.
App. A (Sacramento County Bar Ass'n Standards of Professional Conduct) (providing that. attorneys "shall
advise" their clients regarding the availability and effect of ADR options); GA. R. U.S.D.C.T.M.D. STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT § B(10)(c) (1998).
70. See, e.g., CA. R. SAN DINGo SUPER. CT. Div. 5, Rule 2.2 (1999) ("[A]ttorneys representing family law
litigants are encouraged to advise their clients of the availability of mediation as an alternative means of dispute
resolution."); DEL. SuP. CT. R. 7 1(B) (1998) (Del. State Bar Ass'n Statement of Principles of Lawyer Conduct)
("Before choosing a forum, a lawyer should review with the client all alternatives, including alternate methods
of dispute resolution."); MiNN. GEN. R. PR.c. 114.03 (1998) (The court will provide information about
available ADR options and "[a]ttomeys shall provide clients with the ADR information."); S. CT. RuLE
17.02(B) R.S. MO (1999) ("[C]ounsel shall advise their clients of the availability of alternative dispute
resolution programs."); GA. R. C.P.R. EC 7-5 (1998) ("A lawyer has a duty to advise the client as to various
forms of dispute resolution."); TX R. LAW. CREED 2(11) (1999) ("I will advise my client regarding the
availability of mediation, arbitration, and other alternative methods of resolving and settling disputes.").
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available to a client may require a level of attention to the details of a case that
may often not occur until the parties are closer to trial. 7 ' Thus, attorneys will be
expected to "analyze" the "cash value" of a lawsuit far earlier than they might
otherwise have done under existing customary practice. This "front-end" analy-
sis may cost clients more. Whether the cash value of the settlement or verdict will
be worth the extra expense is an open question.72
As one example, a Michigan Bar Opinion provides that an attorney must
disclose "all information pertinent to a mediation decision," including "the cost,
whether the decision-maker is a single individual or panel of individuals, the
format of the presentation to the forum, whether the decision is binding, the
length of time before a decision is rendered, and the general objective of the
forum."
7 3
This view is undergirded by Model Rule 1.4(b) which requires that "a lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.",74 The rule further states
that "the client shall have sufficient information to participate intelligently in
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and the means by which
they are to be pursued."' 75 Issues such as how much information, how long an
attorney must take in explaining alternatives and whether the costs of such an
explanation are sufficient to comply with this rule will add to the cost of legal
advice.76 A resolution of these issues will depend on what is encompassed by the
general requirement to communicate with one's clients.77
71. Comment 2 to Proposed Rule 1.4 of the Virginia Code of Professional Conduct provides that the
"guiding principle" in this determination "is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for
information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as
to the character of representation." See VA. RuLEs Rule 1.4 (Proposed), supra note 48.
72. Note also, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to reveal earlier in the discovery
process the strengths and weaknesses of a case, thus facilitating "realistic negotiations" and settlement. See
Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 785,
785-86 (1998). It is at least arguable that ADR may be an option that provides a way to avoid the often
exorbitantly large expenses associated with discovery in the Federal Courts. Statistically, discovery has become
"the bulk of the civil litigator's work." Id. at 787. However, "[c]ases involving extensive discovery are in fact
relatively rare." Id. at 791. Statistics suggest that whether and how much discovery is undertaken is tied to "case
complexity." See id. One study found that "cases with more discovery were actually less likely to settle." Id. at
796. Compare Alan Van Etten & Ellen Godbey Carson, Why the Hawaii State Bar Supports ADR, (visited Sept.
28, 1999) <http://hsba.org/ADR/supports.htinl> (discussing huge savings experienced by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (twenty four million dollars in three years), the Resolution Trust Corporation ($115.5
million in four years), the U.S. Air Force (four million dollars on a hundred Equal Employment Opportunity
complaints) and the U.S. Mint (three million dollars on 220 Equal Employment Opportunity complaints).
General Mills "refuses to do business with companies that won't use ADR, and reports millions saved in legal
fees and saved management time." Id.
73. Garwin, supra note 46, at 84 quoting from State Bar of Mich., Standing Comm. on Professional and
Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-255 (1996).
74. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.4(b).
75. Id.
76. See Warmbrod, supra note 10, at 811.
77. See J. Nick Badgerow, Can We Talk?: The Lawyer's Ethical, Professional and Proper Duty to
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In contrast to the more detailed Model Rule 1.4(b), a Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 17.02(b) merely provides that lawyers "shall advise their clients of the
availability of alternative dispute resolution programs., 78 This "weak" consulta-
tion is, of course, far less burdensome because it does not require an individual
analysis of the case file, but merely a generic explanation of the ADR concept.
Certainly, the transaction costs in such a "weak" consultation requirement would
be less, but the utility to the client may be commensurably less as well.
However, unless there is some specificity regarding the modality of disclosure,
the consent process is likely to become both boilerplate and rote in short order.
This certainly has been the experience in informed consent studies in the medical
and human experimentation arenas. 79 An abstract duty of disclosure will likely
result in disclosure about ADR generally, and not a specific and concrete work-up
of the strengths and weaknesses of using ADR in the specific case at hand. While
such a work-up would suggest a serious or "heavy" consultation requirement,
and would contribute to greater "front-end" attorney time and costs, it would
ensure that the client himself has personally thought through the ADR option.
Thus, Nolan-Haley and others argue for relying on a test of effective client
decision making rather than on mechanical fact of informed consent. 80 Nolan-
Haley's"strong" or "robust" informed consent requirement goes further than the
"strong" disclosure requirement discussed above. 8' For one, she is less interested
Communicate with Clients, 7-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 105, 106-07 (1998). Any general requirement must
attempt to define both the extent of communication and the quality of communication. The "amount of
communication, so to speak, must be sufficient for the client to make informed decisions regarding the "means
by which" the dispute will be pursued. For discussion of whether ADR is a "means issue", see supra text
relating to notes 50-53. The "quality" of communication, on the other hand, must be sufficient to allow a client
to make "informed decisions." The advice is required to range far beyond the strictly legal. It beggars the
imagination that the advice duty reaches to extra-legal matters and not to the venue of the dispute resolution
itself.
78. S.CT. RULE 17.02(b) R.S. MO (1999).
79. See Dorothy Derrickson, Informed Consent to Human Subject Research: Improving the Process of
Obtaining Informed Consent for Mentally Ill Persons, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 143, 144 (1997). The author
discusses various methods of obtaining informed consent and the relative effectiveness of each method. See id.
at 143. For example, the "long form method" of providing a "long list of medical terms" is not effective
because it "falls to ensure that the potential subject comprehends [his] role and the protocol of the study." Id. at
156. She recommends revising the existing federal regulations to include an "oral conversation" that will
"preserve the subject's autonomy" and include "meaningful consent." Id. at 157. She states that research has
shown that "obtaining informed consent through a conversation from a potential subject with impaired
cognitive abilities produces the highest rate of comprehension" because it provides the physician with
opportunities to both clarify, using clearer terms or those a lay person understands, and repetition. Id. at 158.
Indeed, as one study of human experimentation points out, "a subject's signature on a consent form is no
assurance that the subject has given informed consent." BRADFORD H. GRAY, HUMAN SUBJECTS IN MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION 236 (1975). Discussing research nurses securing consent forms for a medical research project
Gray states "[Allthough they took responsibility for getting a signature on the consent form, it was not clear
how much responsibility they felt for informing subjects." Id. at 215.
80. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated
Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775 (1999). Indeed, Nolan-Haley proposes a "sliding-scale model of
infomed consent disclosures." Id. at 827.
81. Id. at 816.
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in the amount of information and the specificity of attorney recommendations, if
any, and is more interested in the parties "minimum level of understanding of the
outcome to which they agree.", 82 Her focus is "the informational needs of
individual disputants. ' ' 83 In that regard, she promotes a "sliding scale model of
informed consent disclosures in which a mediator has additional informed
consent responsibilities whether parties participate in voluntary mediation and
... whether they are represented by counsel." 84 To buttress this point, Nolan-
Haley notes that many ethical codes, standards and court rules require that a
mediator assure himself that any consent is truly informed.85 While one can have
sympathy for the robust view of consent Nolan-Haley proposes, it is hard to
imagine the kind of "educating decision making" she proposes "in all the
disparate circumstances under which ... [ADR] ... occurs." 86
V. How WILL ATORNEYS SHOW THAT THEY HAVE MET THE ADR
CONSULTATION OBLIGATION?
The problem of proving compliance is really a second-order issue that
becomes important only if attorneys fear civil liability or a bar association
complaint for failure to comply with an obligation.87 In such instances, a
boilerplate "form," similar to informed consent forms in medical practice, may
be used, whereby the client would attest that he was informed about his ADR
options and consulted by an attorney about its relevance to his case.
For example, attorney Tom Arnold provides clients with a copy of a paper he
authored entitled "A Vocabulary of ADR Procedures," which he describes as
"reveal[ing] the processes" and assisting in the "mak[ing] of a paper trail of full
disclosure which would be beneficial in the event of a malpractice suit."
8 8
Further, such a paper enables "complementary oral disclosure to be made in half
an hour of conversation instead of a half a week of conversation.", 89 Professor
Sander suggests that "attorneys could be required to hand out a brochure that
describes the most common alternatives and to discuss these options with their
clients and opponents." 90 The attorney could then, as part of his pre-trial
submission, certify that he had complied with this obligation.91
82. Id. at 827.
83. Id. at 824.
84. Id. at 827.
85. Id. at 824 n.234.
86. Id. at 824.
87. See, e.g., Chalom v. Benesh, 560 A.2d 746, 746 (N.J. Super. 1989) (attorney's failure to note in the
complaint seeking fees owed that she had notified her client of the option to arbitrate fee disputes as provided by
statute resulted in vacation of a default judgment against the owing client).
88. Tom Arnold, Why ADR?, 493 PLI/PAT 245, 253 (1997).
89. Id.
90. Sander, supra note 11, at 50.
91. Id.
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Empirical studies of informed consent92 in the medical profession, however,
have "cast doubt on the practicality and performance of informed consent.",
93
The studies have "consistently" revealed that: 1) "doctors do not tell patients
what tests they are performing or why;" 2) "doctors can frame the information
they provide patients and quite successfully generate the physician-desired
consent or refusal of the treatment;" and 3) "only about half of patients recall
being informed of serious risks of interventions, such as the risk of death." ' 94 It is
at least questionable whether this approach would serve to adequately inform a
client regarding a proposed legal strategy.
Use of the signed consent form case creates, if not a safe harbor, then a
practical presumption of consent. 95 Indeed, some commentators view informed
consent forms in more problematic populations - such as human experimenta-
tion protocols - as functionally insulating the practitioner from liability rather
than increasing patient communication or patient understanding. 96 Similar obser-
vations may be relevant in the context of legal practice.
Similarly, the Western District Court of Texas requires that "[u]pon order of
the Court entered early in the case, the parties shah submit a report addressing the
status of settlement negotiations ... and evaluating whether alternative dispute
resolution is appropriate in the case. Counsel shall certify in the report that their
clients have been informed of the ADR procedures available in this district."
9 7
92. See, e.g., Evan G. DeRenzo, Ph.D., et al., Assessment of Capacity to Give Consent to Research
Participation: State-of-the-Art and Beyond, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 66, 71 (1998) (discussing one study
in which the "five requirements of the doctrine of informed consent" were distilled into the following:
disclosure of information, patient's understanding thereof, patient's competency to understand, patient's
voluntariness in making the decision and the decision itself, including the role of information disclosure
therein).
93. Sandra H. Johnson, End-of-Life Decision Making: What We Don't Know, We Make Up; What We Do
Know, WeIgnore, 31 IND. L. REV. 13, 14 (1998).
94. Id. at 13-14.
95. One alternative would be to require physicians to "ascertain and ensure the patient's understanding"
rather than simply have physician disclosures and patient signatures. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed
Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 946 (1994). Individual states vary in their requirements for informed consent, but
will provide a presumption many times where, for example, explanatory language was easy to understand,
sufficiently detailed and risks and alternatives were disclosed and explained. Id. at 946 n. 189.
96. See ARNOLD RosoFF, INFORMED CONSENT 281 (1981). Indeed Rosoff has suggested that the main purpose
served by a written consent form is that it provides the most direct, effective proof of a valid "consent."
97. U.S.D.C. W.D. TX. LocAL RULE CV-88(a) (1999) (emphasis added). See also MT R. U.S.D. CT. Crv.
Rule 235-1 (1999) (providing that every party file a Preliminary Pretrial Statement that addresses "the
feasibility [of] invoking alternative dispute resolution procedures"); See also N.D. CA U.S.D.C. L.R. 16-12
(1999), which states that:
Counsel and client shall certify that both have:
(1) Read the brochure entitled Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Northern District of
California;
(2) Discussed the available dispute resolution options provided by the court and private entities;
and
(3) Considered whether their case might benefit from any of the available dispute resolution
options.
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The Association of the Bar of the City of New York98 subcommittees on
arbitration and ADR have submitted to the New York Supreme Court, the state?'
trial court, a proposed draft "Notice of Dispute Resolution Alternatives," 99 based
in part on the California District Court rule and other relevant provisions.' ° The
proposed notice "introduces litigants to mediation, nonbinding arbitration and
neutral evaluation, and explains mediation at length," and also includes informa-
tion on the selection of a mediator.'01 The proposed notice also includes a
certification section which both the attorney and client must sign for purposes of
acknowledgment. 102
98. The Association adopted the following policy statement in 1995: "Every lawyer should be knowledge-
able about alternative dispute resolution processes, and should advise the lawyer's clients of the availability of
any appropriate alternatives to litigation so such clients can make an informed choice concerning resolution of
present and prospective disputes." Letter from Michael A. Cooper, President, The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York, to Stephen G. Crane, Justice, New York Supreme Court (July 14, 1998) (on file with The Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York).
99. See Ready or Not: City Bar Drafts Uniform ADR Notice, 16:7 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF
LITIGATION 93, 103, 108 (July/Aug. 1998) [hereinafter City Bar].
100. Telephone interview with Stephen A. Hochman, Co-chair, Joint Subcomm. of the ADR and Arbitration
Comm. of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 1998) (explaining that the Joint Subcomm. also
examined Colo. Ethics Rule 2.1, as well as Kan. City Supreme Court Rule 17.04). Telephone interview with
Kenneth L. Andrichik, Co-chair, Joint Subcomm. of the ADR and Arbitration Comm. of The Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of New York (Jan. 5, 1999) (adding that the Joint Subcomm. also considered Minn. General Rule of
Practice 114.03, similar to Colo. Ethics Rule 2.1. As of early January 1999, the recommendations had not yet
been approved by the court.).
101. See City Bar, supra note 99, at 108.
102. See id. ADR Certification and Attorney Questionnaire.
"ADR CERTIFICATION AND ATTORNEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Re: [identify lawsuit]
Pursuant to Court Rule XX, each attorney and party to the above lawsuit is required to complete this
certification, and each attorney is required to complete this questionnaire and submit it to the Court within
days after the defendant has served an answer or made a motion in response to the complaint.
Certification. The undersigned attorney for - ("Client") has provided Client with a copy
of the ADR Notice required by Court Rule XX, and the undersigned Client acknowledges having
received a copy of such ADR notice.
Attorney Questionnaire. In the event your case is not ordered into mediation by the Court under its
Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, are you and your client willing to elect to enter into
mediation or any other ADR procedure at this time? - Yes - No
If Yes and you prefer an ADR procedure other than mediation, please indicate your choice here.
If No, you may but are not obligated to explain below why you and your
client are unwilling to commence an ADR procedure at this time (attach additional sheet, if
necessary):
Note: If you believe you need some discovery before you and your client can commence an ADR
procedure, you can either raise those concerns with the judge or with the mediator or other neutral.
Please be aware that a mediator or other neutral, as part of the ADR process, may assist you in
obtaining the needed information more quickly and efficiently than by means of traditional discovery.
Dated:
Signature of Attorney Signature of Client"
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The Utah voluntary court-annexed ADR program requires parties and their
counsel to watch a short video entitled "ADR: A Different Choice."' 03 Parties
who choose not to pursue arbitration sign a form that they have seen the video,
discussed ADR with counsel, and reject the ADR option.' 0 4
Yet another alternative may be to incorporate notice into the earliest communi-
cations with the client, perhaps through the initial fee agreement. 0 5 The "fee
agreement presents the attorney with a terrific opportunity" to address not only
fee issues, but also to define the particular scope of representation or relation-
ship. 10 6 ADR could easily be worked into the agreement and discussion thereof,
and at the same time, serve as a memorialization of notice provided. 
107
Some attorneys who fear malpractice claims based on an ADR rule argue that
such a rule imposes unnecessary, additional burdens on the attorney. 108 They feel
that ADR increases costs to their clients because of the fees incurred in preparing
for, attending, and conducting arbitration and mediation. '09 Further, an attorney
must also allocate time for a reasonable explanation to be given to the client.
Such cost considerations may be particularly significant for corporate clients who
incur significant expense in pre-ADR discovery."0 But, if an attorney is under a
Letter from Michael A. Cooper, President, The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, to Stephen G. Crane,
Justice, New York Supreme Court (July 14, 1998) (on file with The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York).
103. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 80, at 840 n.141.
104. See id.
105. See Sander, supra note 11, at 50 (proposing that "the lawyer write a letter signed by the client, much as
is now done with contingent fee agreements").
106. See, e.g., Steven A. Lewis & Ellen R. Peck, Earning and Keeping Your Fees, CAL. BAR J. 18, 20 (Aug.
1998).
107. See also Zacharias, supra note 54, at 1368 (discussing that at the beginning of a relationship certain
"requirements call for verifiable action;" thus, compliance can be ensured by "reviewing the lawyer's
memorialization of the conversations or questioning the client," especially where the law requires conveyance
of information in writing).
108. One survey conducted in Minnesota uncovered that another obstacle to ADR use was attorney
perceptions and behavior. Minnesota's experiment with ADR resulted in a mandatory ADR consideration rule,
which required attorneys to consider ADR in every civil case, discuss ADR with their client(s) and opposing
counsel, and advise the court regarding their conclusions about ADR. See Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh,
Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376, 376
(1997). Despite Rule 114's decade long history and use in the court system, ninety percent of attorneys
responding to a survey stated that they would, at a minimum, only "sometimes" use ADR. Id. at 384. The result
of the survey indicated that a significant number of attorneys use ADR because they feel coerced into it. See id.
at 385. The underlying fear in these results is that "if the lawyers philosophical map fails to embrace a
client-centered dispute resolution process, neither lawyers nor their clients will ever benefit fully from ADR."
Id. at 392-93. Gary Friedman, a mediator and trainer, states that the "attitude problem" is this: "Attorneys
accustomed to seizing power in law and practice must learn to give it away to the parties in mediation. That's
counterintuitive for lots of lawyers whose habits are such that they feel the essence of being a good lawyer is
controlling their client." Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, 82 A.B.A. J. 54, 57 (Aug. 1996).
109. See Hon. H. Jeffrey Coker, ADR in Coconino County, 33 Aiuz. Arr' 30, 30 (1996). Despite this
opinion, most attorneys in Coconino County, Arizona, responded overwhelmingly to ADR use by becoming
arbitrators and mediators, and by voluntarily advocating ADR programs to their clients.
110. See John Maul, ADR in the Federal Courts: Would Uniformity be Better?, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 245, 261
(1996). It is relevant to consider the economic impact of mandatory ADR. It has been suggested that "there is
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duty to effectively serve his client, is he not also under a duty to help his client
choose the best form of ADR to pursue his client's objectives?"'
Absent such a form, attorneys would have to show compliance by reference to
their case notes or by the messier Kabuki dance of "he said, she said." Given
such an alternative, some type of "consent" form appears preferable. Indeed, the
consent form is likely to be used to confirm the discussion referenced in the case
files.
VI. CASE MANAGEMENT AND THE CLIENT: CONSIDERATION AND CONSULTATION
OF ADR AS AN ALTERNATIVE: CAN THE ATTORNEY Go IT ALONE?
In an effort to encourage increased use of ADR alternatives, many states
require that ADR be considered at or before the pre-trial or status conference
often called by judges prior to trial. 1 2 For example, a Tennessee statute provides
that at the initial case management conference "the possibility of settlement or
the use of extrajudicial procedures, including alternative dispute resolution to
resolve the dispute" is a topic that may be considered.' 1 3 Similarly, Illinois
Supreme Court Rules call for a case management conference in no event more
than 182 days following the filing of the complaint. The Rules provide that "the
advisability of alternative dispute resolution" shall be considered by counsel at
the case management conference. 1
14
It must be recognized that an ADR case management duty need not necessarily
encompass a consultation requirement.' '5 The case management duty could, in
little strong data supporting the theory that ADR saves significant time and money for participants or the
system." Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or
Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 1,46 (1993). Katz argues that most existing studies lack adequate
control groups and measure single programs, thereby failing to provide a source of comparable data. See id. In
fact, most studies reporting high satisfaction rates with ADR methods involve satisfaction with fairness and the
need to be heard rather than costs and speed. See id. at 48-49.
111. See, e.g., Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Shouldn't We Make Full Disclosure to Our Clients of ADR Options?,
SC59 ALI-ASA 755, 762 (1998) (noting that under the proposed text of the Rules of Professional Conduct being
considered in Virginia that "attorneys who do not discuss ADR with their clients may expose themselves to
discipline .... The proposed rules in Virginia require attorneys to advise their clients of the advantages and
disadvantages of all options for pursing the clients' objectives, including ADR."). See Virginia State Bar, supra
note 8.
112. See CT R. SUPER CT. CIV. § 14-13 (1998) (providing that parties and counsel shall attend and consider
"alternative dispute resolution options to trial" at a pre-trial conference); KY R. JEFFERSON CIR. CT. Rule
708(A)(a) (1999) ("During any status conference, the Court will address and the parties shall be prepared to
discuss . .. alternative dispute resolution."). See infra App. II (listing representative procedural rules in State
and Federal courts).
113. TN. Civ. PRO. RULE 16.03(7) (1998). A Rhode Island statute provides a more oblique recommendation,
but one that arguably includes the consideration of ADR alternatives, providing that "[in any action the court
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider: ...
[s]uch other matters as may aid the disposition of the action." RI. R. R.C.P Rule 16(5) (1999).
114. I11. S. Ct. R. § 218(a)(7).
115. See Fitzpatrick, supra note Ill, at 772 ("court-administered arbitration is neither voluntary nor binding
which may cause a tendency not to take the procedure seriously").
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theory, be met by the attorney discussing ADR with opposing counsel and the
court, to the exclusion of the client." 16 If the goal of ADR is to maximize client
autonomy (instead of litigation efficiency), however, an ADR case management
conference requirement does not substitute for an ADR client consultation rule.
The client should be entitled to retain autonomy and control the decision
whether to pursue ADR because of the "importance of the decision to the
client." "17 The client will ultimately bear the risk and suffer the consequences of
whatever choice he makes." 8 If the ADR option is presented, the client may.
select ADR in light of what the client judges to be his best interest. With an
explanation of available options provided by the attorney, the ultimate decision
should rest with the client.
VII. WILL FAILURE To FOLLOW THE RULE REQUIRING ADR CONSULTATION
RESULT IN BAR DISCIPLINE OR MALPRACTICE LIABILITY?
Violations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct may result in disciplin-
ary proceedings; however, the Model Rules are not intended to provide a basis for
civil liability." 9 While I have no statistics regarding the level of enforcement of
Model Rule 1.2, if the ADR consultation is part of the prescriptive portion of the
Model Rule, one would expect bar discipline at least in egregious cases. This
would, of course, require that there be a mandatory and not a precatory
requirement to address ADR options with a client.
Virginia State Bar Counsel James McCauley suggests that a violation of the
proposed Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct is appropriately followed by
disciplinary action, "[i]f a lawyer fails completely and utterly to inform of ADR
in circumstances where it would be a viable option and reasonable practitioners
in the same area would have recommended ADR."' 20 He explains that "[t]he
purpose of the comments is to be more than aspirational .... 12
The real risk for an attorney who fails to advise clients about ADR options is
the possibility of a malpractice claim. And this is the case notwithstanding that
the theory of malpractice liability for derogation of ethical rules should yield a
different result. Thus, the introductory "Scope" section to the Model Rules states
that a "[v]iolation of a rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
116. This assumption has not, to my knowledge, been tested.
117. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 10.
118. See id. Choice of litigation orADR will have different risks and benefits. For example, "ADR options, if
successful, are likely to resolve the case earlier, quicker and with less expense and greater privacy" than
litigation, but a client risks being "overpowered" in a mediation which takes place without "some of the
procedural protections that are present in court." Id.
119. See supra text relating to notes 4-8.
120. Baker McClanahan, Failure to Discuss ADR May Bring Ethics Charge, 12 VA. L.WKLY. 1017, 12 (Feb.
2, 1998).
121. Id. at 13.
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create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached."' 22 And indeed the
earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility went further underscoring in its
"scope" section that "[tihe Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary
procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, not does it undertake
to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct." 1
23
While most states accept this limitation, some do allow the introduction of the
Model Rules as evidence of the common law duty of care. Indeed Section 74 of
the Draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states:
(2) Proof of a violation of a rule or statute regulating the conduct of lawyers:
(a) does not give rise to an implied cause of action for lack of care;
(b) does not preclude other proof concerning the duty of care in Subsec-
tion (1); and
(c) may be considered by a trier of fact as an aid in understanding and
applying the standard of Subsection (1) to the extent that (i) the rule or
statute was designed for the protection of persons in the position of the
claimant and (ii) proof of the content and construction of such a rule or
statute is relevant to the claimant's claim.' 
24
Proponents of this viewpoint argue that permitting a violation of the Model
Rules to be used in a civil liability context would allow for the development of a
framework in which to place attorney behavior when considering whether certain
behavior is actionable or not. t25 Over time developing caselaw will likely create a
list of permissible and impermissible behaviors and give the Model Rules greater
weight for purposes of enforcement. 
126
122. MODEL RULES scope (1983). See, e.g., Baxt v. Liloia, 1998 WL 397181 (N.J. July 17, 1998) (declining
to use the Rules of Professional Conduct to establish a basis for civil liability); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (March 1991) (discussing the need for the legal profession to
"reestablish an independent identity for [the] profession" to counterbalance the changes in regulation that have
come about due to external pressure).
123. MODEL CODE scope (1979).
124. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 (Tentative Draft No. 8,
March 21, 1997). But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 631, 632 (1997) (criticizing this
Restatement as "suffer[ing] from the temporal flaws" of other such Restatements in that "it looks backward, not
forward, and thus will provide little guidance, at least on some important issues").
125. See Daniel L. Draisen, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Their Relationship to Legal
Malpractice Actions: A Practical Approach to the Use of the Rules, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 81 (1997).
126. One author posits that "[w]hile particular customs may seem to insulate the legal profession in a
particular community against liability, ajury is always free to decide that there was a breach if those customs are
inconsistent with broader patterns of attorney diligence." Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the
Structure of Negligence Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 679 (1998) (arguing that traditional negligence models
"cannot adequately interpret the key concepts of duty and breach in the law of attorney malpractice" and that
the traditional model should be replaced with a "relational model"). See also D. Alan Rudlin, Ethics: A Duty to
Inform Clients about ADR?, 11 VA. L.WKLy. 342 (Sept. 16, 1996) ("Alternative dispute resolution has
unquestionably evolved into much more than an "alternative" to litigation. Embraced and implemented by the
courts, by corporate counsel and increasingly by law firms, ADR has become a well established, integral part of
the practice of law.").
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The real risk for an attorney who fails to advise clients about ADR options is
the possibility of a malpractice claim.' 2 7 Legal scholars have listed several
reasons why courts may specifically impose liability on an attorney for failure to
advise a client about ADR.' 28 The medical malpractice concept of informed
consent could potentially "create a precedent for a cause of action against
attorneys."' 129 Just as a doctor is liable for his failure to explain alternative,
available treatments, so, theoretically, could an attorney be liable for his failure to
explain alternative, available resolutions. ' 30 In fact, attorneys may even be held
to higher standards of communication, because a doctor's primary skills are
focused on treating disease, whereas an attorney's primary function is to
communicate alternatives, risks and benefits of proposed alternatives. '31
A direct corollary to this line of reasoning is found in Model Rule 1.4, which
requires that an attorney provide a client with all of the information reasonably
necessary to make an informed decision.' 32 Taken to its logical conclusion, both
the doctor and attorney are faced with a similarly delicate situation, as both must
fulfill a duty to inform, and yet allow the respective patient or client to ultimately
make a decision as to which course of action to pursue. Control rests in the hands
of the patient or client who must bear the ultimate consequence of the surgery or
litigation.
We must further recognize that an attorney has a financial interest in his client's
choices and this may raise conflict of interest concerns.' 33 Simply stated, an
127. In a recent case before the New Jersey Supreme Court, Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 714 A.2d
271(1998), the court refused to use the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct to establish a basis for civil
liability and noted that research produced no other such cases establishing liability "premised solely on a breach
of the relevant provisions." However, such rules are relevant for purposes of providing evidence of an attorney's
violation of a duty of care. Id. at *5. See also Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal Cases (1990-1995)
Involving Rules of Attorney Conduct, Q247 ALI-ABA 311, 334-35 (1996) (suggesting that under such
"ambiguous guidance" as provided through the "inherent fragmentation of the existing state rules" and "bad
draftsmanship" apparent in the many variations, to discipline an attorney thereunder could possibly violate Due
Process).
128. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 9-12. See also Warmbrod, supra note 10, at 813-17.
129. Cochran, supra note 6, at 10. See generally VanAuken-Haight & Enseln, supra note 10, at 1039-40;
Warnbrod, supra note 10, at 814. Professor Sander also makes this analogy. See Sander, supra note 11, at 50.
130. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 10. See generally VanAuken-Haight & Enseln, supra note 10, at 1039-40;
Warmbrod, supra note 10, at 814. See Sander, supra note 11, at 50.
131. See Cochran, supra note 50, at 838-39.
132. Alaska recently amended Rule 1.4 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, adding a paragraph (c)
that requires an attorney to provide notice to his clients in the following instances: 1) his malpractice insurance
is below $100,000 per claimant; 2) his malpractice insurance falls below this amount at any time; or, 3) his
malpractice insurance is terminated. Alaska Requires Lawyers to Inform Clients About Malpractice Insurance,
67:27 U.S. L. WK. 2422, 2422 (Jan. 1999). South Dakota is considering a similar amendment, and is also
considering an amendment to Rule 7.2 which would require an attorney to disclose in advertising whether the
attorney held malpractice insurance of at least $100,000. Id. at 2423.
133. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 11; Gear, supra note 54, at 2476-77 (noting and rejecting the trend of
ethics scholars to argue for subordination of client autonomy and further arguing that this "ideology of
domination ... encourages attorneys to deprive clients of the right to engage in autonomous moral judgment
and therefore denies clients true autonomy). See also Freedman, supra note 57, at 470.
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attorney may have a financial stake in how a client chooses to resolve his legal
dispute.' 34 We all know the apocryphal tale of the litigators who view new
complex cases as opportunities for running hours and keeping litigation sections
busy. 135 On this view, if the client selects arbitration or mediation over litigation
(which in many instances may be more lucrative for the attorney or law firm), the
attorney might stand to earn less. 13 6 This dilemma supports a heightened
responsibility of full disclosure by the attorney, thereby enabling the client to
select how he would like to proceed or to choose to leave the decision to the
attorney's professional judgment.
On occasion it may be in the best interest of the client for his attorney to refer
the case to a colleague who has more experience in ADR methods, 37 thus
"losing" a case he was otherwise qualified to handle. Other attorney "interests"
may create conflicts as well. An attorney may want to further his reputation as a
litigator or perhaps display his litigation skills to attract new clients. 138 These
attorney interests and the potential conflicts that they may create suggest that it is
the client, rather than the attorney, who should decide whether to litigate or
pursue ADR.
It should be pointed out that the question may no longer turn on the existence
of express "ethical" language mandating ADR disclosure. The increased applica-
tion of ADR as a method of dispute resolution may place an attorney at risk if he
is not familiar with ADR methods, 1 3 9 following a standard which requires him to
exercise "the degree of skill, knowledge and judgment ordinarily possessed by
members of the legal profession."140 As more state professional codes require
ADR disclosure implicitly or otherwise, an attorney's failure to instruct a client
regarding ADR options could therefore result in liability.
Although, arguably the failure to present ADR options may result in injury or
loss, the actual proof of such injury or loss may be very challenging.14 ' For
example, in an informed consent case, a plaintiff must show that if he had been
offered the alternative option that he would have chosen that option.' 42 But in a
malpractice claim over an attorney's failure to discuss ADR alternatives, the
plaintiff would have to show that he would have chosen that option, that opposing
134. See VanAuken-Haight & Enseln, supra note 10, at 1038.
135. Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to
Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13:3 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 831, 846 n.2 (1998) (stating that
other commentators suggest that this contributes to the "reluctance" to refer matters to mediation). See
generally Cornell/PERC, supra note 1.
136. See id. See also Widman, supra note 51, at 150 ("Many lawyers see... [ADR] ... as a threat to their
income and an unwelcome abandonment of tradition.").
137. See VanAuken-Haight & Enseln, supra note 10, at 1038.
138. See id.
139. Id. See also Warmbrod, supra note 10, at 810 (discussing the reasonable attorney standard of care).
140. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.1. See also Cochran, supra note 6, at 11.
141. See Cochran, supra note 6, at 12-13.
142. Id. at 12.
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counsel would have accepted the option proposed, and that the choice would
have proven successful. 143
The increased use of ADR raises not only issues relative to professional
standards, but also client expectations. Whether or not the Model Rules are made
more explicit, clients will demand or expect to be advised of ADR alternatives
and methods. If an attorney is ill-equipped to do so or is unfamiliar with ADR
methods, he risks exposure to malpractice liability, not to mention the diminished
confidence of clients in his perceived capabilities.
VIII. DOES LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH ADR TECHNIQUES AMONG ATrORNEYS
UNDERCUT THE UTILITY OF MANDATORY ADR CONSULTATION?
As one legal scholar has pointed out, to the extent that a lawyer's duty to
provide competent representation has come to include knowledge and skills
regarding ADR, the job description of "lawyer" has "acquired new dimen-
sions." 144
As a result, if the bar chooses an ADR consultation requirement, attorneys
must be given the opportunity to educate themselves on methodologies of ADR
before a disclosure rule may equitably be enforced. 145 While I have seen no
empirical evidence regarding how much knowledge attorneys have about ADR,
there is no reason to believe that attorneys cannot acquire the necessary
knowledge through CLE programs or other programs.
Implementing such a rule, however, requires that attorneys receive appropriate
introduction to ADR methods. Such training may take place on three levels. First,
as ADR gains broader acceptance, law schools are beginning to enlarge their
ADR offerings and, in some instances, to integrate ADR into the "core"
curriculum. 146 Second, state bar associations may require new attorneys to attend
143. Id.
144. Edwin H. Greenebaum, Lawyers'Agenda for Understanding Alternative Dispute Resolution, 68 IND.
L.J., 771, 788 (1993). See also Rudlin, supra note 126, at 7 ("It is in the best interest of all practitioners to have
a working knowledge of mediation and how it can serve their clients."); ROBIN M. KENNEDY ET AL., OHto JUR.
3D ALTERNATIVE DispuTE RESOLUTION § 122 (1997) ("It is... good practice to fully disclose all the elements of
ADR to each client.").
145. For example, the Virginia State Bar submitted its petition to the Supreme Court of Virginia to adopt
the new Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct this past September, recommending an implementation date
of January 1, 2000, because "[t]his would allow ample time for the rules to be published throughout Virginia
and explained in CLE programs." See Virginia State Bar, supra note 8. Indiana's state bar has moved one
step beyond educating attorneys to educating the public. Entitled "Dateline ADR," the Indiana State
Bar Association's ADR Section's education committee and WTCY-Channel 16, the City-County Govern-
ment Access channel in Indianapolis, teamed up to produce numerous television programs which have
been designed to educate the public about ADR. See Judith Stimson, A Television Series in the Making: Dateline
ADR, 40 RES GESTAE 22 (1997). In the District of Columbia, ADR programs have been advertised over the
radio and on billboards as well as in telephone books and on flyers distributed to the public, containing
descriptions of the programs, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the pilot program. See Antionette
M. Guidry, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Broadening the Use Through Louisiana Courts, 19 S.U. L. REV. 403
(1992).
146. Indeed, there is a nascent revolution in law schools that brings ADR into the learning process as an
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an ADR course prior to admission to the bar or as part of a continuing legal
education requirement. Finally, and perhaps the most risky, would be to allow
attorneys to self-educate on ADR methods.
How much ADR training is necessary will depend on how much ADR advice
the obligation requires an attorney to provide. Merely advising a client as to the
existence of ADR options requires far less skill than actually analyzing the case
to determine whether pursuing ADR will provide any benefits.
The various meanings of any proposed consultation obligation require that
consideration be given to Model Rule 1.1, which addresses the technical level of
skill required for an attorney to provide ADR advice. Model Rule 1.1 provides
that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." 147
The rule requires that an attorney provide competent representation and in so
doing, the Comment to the rule states that "in determining whether a lawyer
employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors
include ... the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question" and
further states that "expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some
instances." 148
If ADR is described as an independent "field of law," we must consider
whether a general practitioner will have the necessary knowledge of ADR
methods to comply with this rule if he is required to provide ADR advice.
Further, if such a specific set of skills exists, it would suggest that the consultation
obligation not only include discussion of ADR options but also include a
discussion of whether, depending on the attorney's skill level, the attorney should
undertake the ADR himself or bring in an ADR specialist. 149
IX. DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE CONSULTATION OBLIGATION
The "consultation obligation" has been anchored in a number of different
norm-creating articulations - each with-a different level of authoritativeness and
binding quality. Among them have been lawyers' creeds and court rules, as well
as bar association and statutory rules of professional conduct.
A. LAWYERS' CREEDS
A number of states have added aspirational creeds to their "black-letter"
regulatory codes of professional behavior. The Texas Lawyer's Creed is an
equal option for lawyers in dispute settlement. See generally Robert B. Moberly, Dispute Resolution in the Law
School Curriculum: Opportunities and Challenges, 50 FLA. L. REv. 583 (Sept. 1998).
147. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1.
148. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.1 cmt. 1.
149. This point should not be ignored. A litigator does not become an ADR specialist by calling himself one,
as the restyling of big firm litigation departments as dispute resolution departments might suggest, and the
obligation to "pass off" a client to an ADR specialist might not sit well in a small firm context. The "knowledge
gap" is likely to be greater the further along the ADR continuum one moves from arbitration to mediation.
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example of an aspirational statement of lawyer responsibilities and goals,)50 The
Lawyer's Creed provides: "I will advise my client regarding the availability of
mediation, arbitration, and other alternative methods of resolving and settling
disputes." 151
The problem with an aspirational statement is that it is just that - aspirational.
While lawyers' creeds certainly recommend the most commendable behavior,
they purposefully lack enforcement mechanisms, 52 so it is hard to gauge
whether such codes are even followed. 153 One commentator, James Moliterno,
argues that the emergence of the civility or professionalism creeds is in response
to the Model Rules' lowest common denominator approach to establishing
minimum standards of conduct.1 54 Such creeds recapture the aspirational stan-
dards of conduct absent in the current Model Rules regulating attorney conduct.
Moliterno argues that such creeds should not be enforceable. 155 Indeed, the
creeds were purposely drafted to be non-binding.1 56 In practice, "civility codes
can cause confusion among the judiciary and the practicing bar," because it is not
always clear when mandatory rules of professional conduct, as opposed to
"aspirational" statements of ideal conduct, are being applied.' 57
150. See TX. R. LAW. CREED 2(11) (1999). Ohio, New Mexico and Georgia also have lawyers' creeds which
incorporate similar aspirational language and goals. See N.M. R. LAW. CREED (1999); OH ST. S.C.C.P.
PROFESSIONALISM (1999); GA. R. BAR LAW. CREED (1998). See generally, Eugene A. Cook et al., A Guide to the
Texas Lawyer's Creed: A Mandate for Professionalism, 10 REv. LITIG. 673 (1991).
151. Id. See also Dwight Jefferson, Courtroom Ethics and Antics Integrity in Advocacy, 36 HOULAW 39, 42
(November/December 1998) (describing how the Houston Bar Ass'n promulgates professional standards which
in part state that when appropriate, attorneys should counsel their clients "with respect to mediation, arbitration,
and other alternative methods of resolving disputes.") The Hawaii State Bar Assocation adopted the Guidelines
of Professional Courtesy and Civility, which provide that:
A lawyer should raise and explore the issue of settlement and alternative dispute resolution in every
case as soon as the case can be evaluated and, if feasible, mediation should be encouraged.
Specifically, a lawyer who manifests professional courtesy and civility: a. Advises the client at the
outset of the availability of alternative dispute resolution.
d. Considers whether the client's interest could be adequately served and the controversy more
expeditiously and economically disposed of by arbitration, mediation or other form of alternative
dispute resolution.
Haw. State Bar Ass'n, Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility § 11 (a), (d). The text of the Guidelines is
available on the Hawaii State Bar Association homepage. See Haw. State Bar Ass'n (visited Sept. 1999)
<http://hsba.org>.
152. But see A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Dispositions, 57 MD. L. REv. 273, 379 n. 12
(1998) (citing several sources that suggest that courts may indeed enforce "civility codes").
153. See id. at 304-05.
154. See James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 781,
793-94 (1997).
155. See id. at 797-99.
156. See id. at 796.
157. See Dickerson, supra note 152, at 304. See also MARLA B. RUBIN, COMPARATIVE ETHICS: THE BACK OF
THE BASEBALL TICKET IN NEW YORK PRACTICE SKILLS COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 5-7 (1998) (stating that
"[f]ederal local court rules about standards of attorney conduct are as varied as judges' personalities"). Thus,
that there may be more than one applicable set of rules is common throughout the United States. For example,
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B. COURT RULES
Many court rules, such as those of Maryland,1 58 require ADR to be an issue
placed "on the table" at a case management conference. For example, the parties
may be required at such a conference to consider "available and appropriate
forms of alternative dispute resolution." '
59
The problem in the case management approach is that it both anchors ADR too
late in time strategically and places it in the wrong value calculus. If ADR is a
requirement to be raised at a case management conference, it will not be
discussed by attorney and client until litigation is well along. It will become a tool
to use when settlement fails rather than as independent track to undertake
notwithstanding litigation options. Further, placing ADR in a case management
context makes it an efficiency value. Also, as previously suggested, the case
management discussion is often between attorneys only and may take place
without client input.
C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Most ADR consultation requirements are situated in state Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. As already discussed, some commentators believe that the state
codes already include an ADR consultation obligation by inference. Others do
not.
1. The Status Quo
The benefit of the status quo is the wide ranging flexibility that it provides.
ADR proponents can stir the pot and encourage ADR without any concern that
they are creating new obligations on the legal profession.
The problem, however, is that the status quo is not a blank slate - it just may
appear to be. If the existing Model Rules implicitly require ADR consultation
then the status quo encourages flexibility only by ignoring clear professional
responsibilities. The fact that the obligation is implicit in no way reduces the
obligation. It means only that the obligation is not facially clear from the
the Colorado Supreme Court Rules are applicable to proceedings in court, whereas the District of Columbia
Rules of Professional Conduct apply "whether or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an
attorney-client relationship." Id. at 6. Even more treacherous are jurisdictions that have more than one district
court, as in the case of Alabama, whose district courts appear to apply the Model Rules and the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id. at 7.
158. See MD. R. Crv. P. 2-504.1(c)(1).
159. See MD. R. Crv. P. 2-504.1(c)(1). Not all court rules refer specifically to ADR. For example, New
Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 1-016(C)(7) provides that participants "may consider and take action with
respect to ... the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." See
infra App. H.
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language of the text but must be "inferred" from it. The implicitness does not
reduce the weight of the obligation. The issue then becomes whether a purely
aspirational or a mandatory explicit requirement would be most appropriate.
2. A Precatory Requirement
160
The value of a precatory requirement lies in the belief that it will, by its
existence, encourage the use of ADR where appropriate, yet will not include any
of the externalities associated with regulatory mandates. We cannot statistically
judge whether this is the case. The aspirational approach also shifts between
statements that attorneys ought to consult on ADR to statements that attorneys in
the appropriate circumstances shall consult on ADR. I count this as precatory as
the issue of appropriate circumstances is, as a practical matter, subjective. Even if
one argues that the question of appropriateness is objective, the proof problems
are sufficiently formidable to likely consign the matter to the judgment of the
attorney.
One example of a precatory obligation is Hawaii, which chose to adopt a
modified version of Model Rule 2.1, providing: "In a matter involving ...
litigation, a lawyer should advise a client of alternative forms of dispute
resolution which might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal
dispute or to reach the legal objective sought." 161
The arguments for an aspirational obligation include, first, that an aspirational
obligation while unenforceable, would still provide guidance for aspired-to
conduct, and second, that it is simply too early to raise the notion of mandatory
enforcement as we are still in a period of "acclimation" to the ADR concept. The
fact is that the proponents of ADR do not view it as superogatory conduct on the
part of an attorney or in any way supplementary to appropriate legal practice. On
the contrary, it would seem likely that members of the ABA Ethics 2000
Commission would view the discussion of ADR alternatives as part of appropri-
ate legal practice. That being the case, as a matter of principle, it should be
viewed as a mandatory, not an aspirational obligation.
True, the addition of precatory language to an ethical code may be accom-
plished without much resistance and may have a certain heuristic value. How-
ever, the bar and bench have been pushing ADR for almost two decades now. The
question is whether these two decades of socialization have brought ADR beyond
the "aspirational" stage. If so, mandatory language is in order.
160. Ethical rules in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey and
New Mexico have a precatory duty to advise or inform a client as to ADR options. See infra App. I. Kansas,
Michigan and Pennsylvania have developed an "implied ethical duty." See id.
161. Haw. R. S. Ct. R.P.C. 2.1 (1997).
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3. A Mandatory Obligation: Explicit or Implicit? 62
While creative ambiguity may have its place in human relationships, it is rarely
successful when expectations of conduct are written down and enforced. Thus, if
we have decided that there should be ADR consultation between lawyer and
client, there can be only one reason not to make that duty explicit. And that reason
is that the externalities are so great that they will otherwise impair the attorney-
client relationship. Among those externalities we may include the cost of
lawyering time, paper work, transaction costs, and the negative risks of unwar-
ranted malpractice actions or bar sanctions for failure to consult.
It must be remembered that an implicit rule is a far different animal than the
aspirational standards found in the old Canons of Professional Ethics163 or the
present day state bar "creeds."t64 The theory behind aspirational standards was
that they reflected goals to which the profession should ideally aspire.
1 65
Enforcement of these standards mainly relied upon one's own internal sense of
duty rather than the use of an external disciplinary force.166 Like an aspirational
standard, the enforceability of an implicit rule may be limited in its use of
external disciplinary force. But while an aspirational standard limits its degree of
obligation by its very design and purpose, the obligation of an implicit rule is
limited only by our inability to decipher its actual presence.' 67 If it can be
determined that an explicit rule contains an implicit shadow,' 68 one is equally
obligated to obey both the explicit text and the implicit shadow. 
169
162. California, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio and Texas have elected
mandatory duty language. See infra App. I.
163. See, e.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1908) and MODEL CODE (1980).
164. See infra note 31.
165. Prior to the Model Rules, the Model Code provided the ethical framework for the legal field.
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSnILry 3 (1979). Like the Canons of Professional Ethics that
served as its basis, the Model Code was largely comprised of "ethical considerations" that were "aspirational in
character" and representative of "the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive."
Id. The Code further stated that the rules were not "mandatory in character" since their violation would be met
with no disciplinary measure. Id.
166. John Austin described "laws" which rely on moral authority as a sole mechanism of enforcement as
"imperfect law." John Austin, Legal Positivism's Challenge to Natural Law Theory: A Positivist Conception of
Law, in PHIL. OF LAW 32-42 (1995). This argument rests on the thesis that the essence of a law is the presence of
a command. Id. Austin describes laws that have no purpose of enforcing compliance as mere "desires" that lack
a sense of command. Id. While expressed "desires" and "commands" may share certain common elements,
Austin holds that only "commands" should be recognized as law in the complete sense. For a more favorable
interpretation of aspirational laws, see generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW (Rev. ed., 1969). For
insight into the substantial influence of this book on the use of aspirational laws in the writing of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, see David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs
801, 806 (1998).
167. For a discussion of the complex hermeneutic and jurisprudence issues involved in deciphering the
meaning and scope of legal rules, see Joseph Raz, Dworkin a New Link in the Chain, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1103 (1986).
168. And indeed, it would be difficult to assert that any explicit assertion is without some implicit meaning.
"It is a universal feature of human communication that what is said or communicated is more than what is
explicitly stated and includes what is implied." See id. at 1106.
169. One must obey since both are equally part of what is communicated. See id.
456
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Once we have agreed upon the need for an enforceable rule rather than an
aspirational standard, is there a reason to prefer implicit phrasing over explicit
phrasing? The question boils down to whether objective standards exist in ways
that allow us to decipher the meaning and scope of language. If such standards do
exist, then clearly, for purposes of understandable definiteness, we ought to
pursue the most explicit expression of our goals. If, however, we are without such
standards, it might be preferable to have implicit laws that are structured in a way
that fosters a degree of indeterminacy. While concrete, explicit, hard-line rules
might offer easily ascertained answers, these fixed answers may be blind to
circumstances unimaginable at their creation. Implicit laws, however, necessarily
contain a degree of vagueness that ideally provides space for third party
decision-makers to tailor the law to the variances and realities of the moment.
Despite the fact that an implicit law may result in a more realistic application
of justice, it may also serve to befuddle the everyday citizen who attempts to
ascertain and obey the law. Is the law to be found in its explicit text, or is the law
what we predict to be the possible implicit meanings that may be derived by a
third party in the future? While indefiniteness might help us to address the
concerns of the moment by interjecting the wisdom of a third party, it also
prevents us from being completely aware of our legal obligations since the
wisdom of the third party is often an unpredictable variable. To some, the
trade-off of using indeterminate language is dangerous and contrary to traditional
principles of fairness.
Despite the risks, many believe that an ADR consultation rule is worth explicit
wording. They want to move ADR from a good idea that might be useful in some
circumstances to a normative requirement of legal practice. The question then
becomes whether the profession wants to go so far in our civil justice system as to
make ADR the default mode for litigation?17° Will we have to "force" recalci-
trant, old-fashioned attorneys to incorporate ADR into their practices?
It is understandable that the profession will be wary of yet one more regulatory
mandate. Nonetheless, as this Paper suggests, such regulation may be necessary.
The challenge is how to formulate a mandatory rule with the least bureaucratic
externalities placed on the profession and the least intrusion into the necessary
trust between attorneys and clients.
CONCLUSION
As this Paper suggests, leaving the Model Rules "as is" merely perpetuates
confusion. It allows the obligation to exist in unarticulated form. No matter how
adroit the tacking and filling, this approach would quickly veer into "fair notice"
170. It should at least be noted that ADR is more appropriate in some instances than others.
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problems and violate due process as understood by contemporary administrative
law jurisprudence. 171
Similarly, while the case-management solution captured in many court rules
may force ADR onto the attorney-client agenda, it will not solve the analytical
question of who makes the choice. Further, as suggested above, it may cause
ADR to be discussed only after a dispute has "ripened" into litigation.
As a practical matter, in approaching this issue, the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility must choose between a precatory rule
urging client consultation on ADR or a mandatory rule concerning client
consultation on ADR. I have discussed a precatory rule above and will discuss the
mandatory option below.
A. A MANDATORY RULE
To a great extent, the entire discussion whether ADR consultation should be
mandatory is a judgement as to the mainstreaming of ADR in the practice of law.
Under existing ethical rules, a lawyer is required to explain substantive options to
their clients. It is only if one posits that ADR is outside the normal scope of legal
practice that one will support an aspirational ADR consultation rule.
This is especially true in the matter of the "work" of lawyers which, in
America at least, encompasses a relatively unbounded list of possible tasks and
projects.
But we should not make the mandate triggered solely on an attorney's
subjective belief as provided in a Kansas Bar opinion, which states that "[w]hen
a lawyer's professional judgment indicates ADR is a viable option, the lawyer
should discuss that option with the client .... Instead, I would argue for
language analogous to that employed in the Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts which provide that "[tihere will be circumstances in which a
lawyer should advise a client concerning the advantages and disadvantages of
available dispute resolution options in order to permit the client to make informed
decisions concerning the representation." 
173
If one takes this approach, it would not be necessary to consider limiting the
ADR consultation requirement to matters where litigation is contemplated 174 or
to suggestions of ADR by opposing counsel as in Michigan. 175 The ADR option
171. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Cates & Fox Co. v.
OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
172. Kan. Bar Ass'n, Professional Ethics -Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 94-01 (1994).
173. MASS. ANN. LAWS S. JUb. CT. Rule 5(5) (emphasis added).
174. See infra App. II.
175. State Bar of Mich., Standing Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-262 (1996) (referring
to Model Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a)-(b) and 2.1). The Michigan Rule differs from the ABA draft in that the duty it
articulates goes beyond providing information about ADR to require a recommendation of ADR where is a
reasonable option. In my view, the duty is more appropriately to provide information as to available options
rather than to recommend particular options.
[Vol. 13:427
ADVISING CLIENTS REGARDING ADR OPTIONS
can be relevant to cases before they go to litigation or even in transactional
matters that most likely will not go to litigation. 176 Similarly, ADR options do not
become reasonable or appropriate merely because they are introduced by an
adversary. The responsibility of a lawyer to fully inform clients of options should
not be conditioned by the proposal of adversaries.
B. DRAFTING RECOMMENDATION
One of the least satisfying features of the existing efforts to codify "ethics" is
the lack of analytic clarity regarding what specific rules mean. In contrast to the
approach of general tenets used in the old ethical considerations, the existing
codification process is designed as a vehicle for professional regulation -
whether self or otherwise. One example of the confusion that arises from this
newer regulatory approach is the uncertainty as to where to locate an ADR
consultation requirement.
As noted, states have based some ADR consultation requirements as duties
under their equivalents of Model Rules 2.1 or 1.4(b). 177 Yet many times states
throw all the texts together in a "hodge-podge" of precedent. 178 For example,
when the ABA Dispute Resolution Committee based an ADR consultation
argument on Model Rule 2.1, and then learned that Model Rule 2.1 was off the
table, the committee quickly changed gears and made the argument that ADR
consultation belonged in Model Rule 1.4(b).
A problem associated with attempting to codifying an ADR obligation in
Model Rules 2.1 and 1.4(b) is that Model Rule 2.1 refers only to a lawyer's duty to
inform his client of "moral, economic, social and political factors." 179 As such,
the rule pertains to a lawyer's duty to render advice about things that are
extra-legal. ADR should not be placed in the context of Model Rule 2.1 because
the very premise that supports the implementation of the rule is that ADR has
become fully integrated in the legal system. The textual support is inconsistent
with the factual finding that justifies the requirement.
It is understandable why many are eager to put an ADR requirement some-
where within the Model Rules; however, it should be remembered that placing an
ADR option in Model Rule 2.1 would understate the legal significance of ADR by
equating it with amorphous extra-legal considerations and would furthermore be
logically inconsistent with any duties enumerated in Model Rule 1.4(b). For
reasons of analytical necessity, if an ADR requirement is to be enacted, it is most
appropriately placed only in the context of Model Rule 1.4(b).
176. One author suggests that in drafting a modem business contract, the competency of an attorney might be
questioned if he fails to include a dispute resolution clause. See Warmbrod, supra note 10, at 810.
177. See supra notes 38-40 for states that use Model Rule 2.1 as a basis for an ADR consultation requirement.
See infra notes 45-47 for states that use Model Rule 1.4 as part of the basis for an ADR consultation requirement.
178. See supra note 45.
179. MODEL RULEs Rule 2.1.
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In considering revisions to the Model Rules, whether to Model Rule 2.1 or
Model Rule 1.4,180 the ABA ought to adopt a formulation like that found in the
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Proposed Draft One which provides: "[a]
lawyer has a duty to inform his client about the availability and applicability of
alternative dispute resolution procedures that are reasonably appropriate under
the circumstances." 
81
This ABA Proposed Draft contains components reflected in the many different
state versions of rules and opinions governing the "duty" of an attorney to advise
clients regarding alternatives to litigation. First, the language establishes clearly
that the attorney is under a duty.1 82 Second, pursuant to such duty an attorney
must provide not only notice of the availability of ADR, but also the applicability
thereof to the client's action.183 Finally, the language "reasonably appropriate
under the circumstances" is an objective standard that may more easily be
evaluated by reviewing bodies to determine compliance therewith.
The Proposed Draft tracks language used by the Michigan State Bar which
held that: "[a] lawyer has an obligation to recommend alternatives to litigation
when an alternative is a reasonable course of action to further the client's inter-
ests .. .. 184
Here, of course, the non-consulting attorney has wiggle room. But a disciplin-
ary committee or a court can objectively review the issues of reasonableness or
appropriateness.
An alternative to an explicit provision in the Model Rules is to reference
discussion of the ADR duty in a "comment" to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. However, it is important to note that the "[c]omments do not add
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with
the [Model] Rules."' 85 In that regard they may be viewed as similar to
interpretive regulations or statements of policy' 86 in the federal regulatory
process. Such "guidance" as we know, lacks the force of law, but states the
180. Testimony before the Ethics 2000 Commission of the ABA has addressed the adoption of language to
amend either rule. See Testimony of Phillip Feldman before the Ethics 2000 Commission, Feb. 1999 (visited
Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/feldman.html>; Testimony of Professor Kimberlee K. Kovach
before the Ethics 2000 Commission, May 29. 1999 (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
e2k/kovach.html>.
181. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Promoting True Alternative Dispute Resolution Through the Ethics Rules,
PROF. LAW. 13, 14 (Spring 1998). See also VA. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.4(c) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1999).
182. This follows California, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio and Texas,
which impose a mandatory duty. See infra App. I.
183. The Kansas Bar Opinion implies that an attorney should discuss the option with his client, implying that
the applicability of ADR to the particular context should be discussed.
184. State Bar of Mich., Standing Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-262 (1996) (referring
to Model Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a)-(b) and 2.1).
185. MODEL RuLEs scope sec. 1.
186. See id.
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agency's position on the law and informs us as to the kinds of situations the
agency would consider inappropriate.
187
If one were to use the Comment approach, I would add a proposed Comment,
to Model Rule 1.4, as follows:
A lawyer should take into consideration, in relevant and appropriate circum-
stances, alternatives to litigation that may further the client's interests and
provide the client with this information in order to assist the client in making an
informed decision as to what avenue should be pursued to achieve the legal
objective sought. In some circumstances, providing notice of the availability of
alternatives to litigation may be sufficient and, in other cases, the applicability
of alternatives may need to be discussed in greater detail.
The ABA need not worry about being too precipitous in promulgating a
mandatory ADR requirement as there is a sense in which the debate over ADR
disclosure may soon be overcome by events. Just as the owl of Minerva flies only
at twilight, so will the ABA be facing the issue of ADR disclosure at a time when
the practice realities have significantly changed. We are already in the dispute
resolution age, not the litigation age. Thus the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998 requires every Federal District Court to institute an ADR scheme.
Once these federal district court programs are operating, every attorney who
envisions some federal practice will have to educate himself, and equally
important, organize his practice to incorporate ADR options into the fabric of his
communications with his clients. Thus, many of the transactional costs adverted
to in this Paper18 8 will be reduced.
As one commentator has suggested, "not only is ADR here but it is becoming a
standard way of resolving legal disputes." 1 8 9 The rules of ethics ought to
recognize this change.
187. See supra text relating to notes 162-63.
188. See supra text relating to notes 12-20.
189. See McClanahan, supra note 120, at 5 (quoting Virginia State Bar Ethics Counsel James M. McCauley
regarding the proposed Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct).
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FIFTY STATE SURVEY: Is THERE A DUTY TO ADVISE
CLIENTS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
OPTIONS?*
THE FOLLOWING STATES HAVE A PRECATORY DUTY: Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Virginia
STATUTES OR COURT RULES:
Arkansas: Attorneys are "encouraged" to advise their clients regarding ADR
options and to "assist" them in selecting the most appropriate procedure. Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-7-204 (Michie 1997).
California: "[A]ttorneys representing family law litigants are encouraged to
advise their clients of the availability of mediation as an alternative means of
dispute resolution." San Diego County Super. Fam. Ct. L.R.
Louisiana: The Louisiana Mediation Act encourages attorneys to discuss
mediation options with their clients. La. R.S. 9:4101-4112.
Massachusetts: "There will be circumstances in which a lawyer should advise a
client concerning the advantages and disadvantages of available dispute resolu-
tion options in order to permit the client to make informed decisions concerning
the representation." Mass. Ann. Laws S. Jud. Ct. R. ch. 3.
New Jersey: "Lawyers should become familiar with available CDR [Complemen-
tary Dispute Resolution Program] programs and inform their clients of them."
N.J. Ct. R. 1.40-1.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OR ETHICS CODES:
Colorado: "In a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer
should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute resolution which might
reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the legal
objective sought." Colo. R.P.C. 2.1.
Delaware: "Before choosing a forum, a lawyer should review with the client all
alternatives, including alternate methods of dispute resolution." Del. R. S. Ct.
71(B) (Delaware State Bar Association Statement of Principles of Lawyer
Conduct).
Hawaii: "In a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer should
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advise a client of alternative forms of dispute resolution which might reasonably
be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective
sought." Haw. R. S. Ct. R.P.C. 2.1.
"A lawyer should raise and explore the issue of settlement and alternative dispute
resolution in every case as soon as the case can be evaluated and, if feasible,
mediation should be encouraged.
Specifically, a lawyer who manifests professional courtesy and civility:
a. Advises the client at the outset of the availability of alternative dispute
resolution.
d. Considers whether the client's interest could be adequately served and the
controversy more expeditiously and economically disposed of by arbitration,
mediation or other form of alternative dispute resolution." Hawaii State Bar
Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility § 11.
New Mexico: "In appropriate cases, I will counsel my client with respect to
mediation, arbitration and other alternative methods of resolving disputes." N.M.
R. Ct. (A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism of the State Bar of New Mexico).
Virginia: "Purely technical legal advice ... can sometimes be inadequate. It
could also ignore, to the client's disadvantage, the relational or emotional factors
driving a dispute. In such a case, advice may include the advantages, disadvan-
tages and availability of other dispute resolution processes that might be
appropriate under the circumstances." Proposed Va. R.P.C. R. 2.1 cmt. 2.
THE FOLLOWING STATES HAVE A MANDATORY DUTY: California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, Virginia
STATUTES OR COURT RULES:
California: "Prior to the pre-trial status conference, counsel shall confer with the
client and discuss the mediation program, and shall ask the client for authoriza-
tion to participate in the mediation program." Bankr. S.D. Ca. L.R. 7016-4.
Connecticut: Where a pre-trial conference is deemed necessary, both the parties
and the attorneys shall attend and shall consider "alternative dispute resolution
options to trial." Conn. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. § 14-13.
Minnesota: The court will provide parties and attorneys with information about
ADR options available. "Attorneys shall provide clients with the ADR informa-
tion." Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 114.03.
Ohio: "Before the initial pre-trial conference in a case, counsel shall discuss the
appropriateness of ADR in the litigation with their clients and with opposing
counsel." Ohio Gen. R. 16.03 (Stark County).
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"I shall counsel you with respect to alternative methods to resolve disputes."
Ohio S. Ct. App. V (Statement on Professionalism, A Lawyer's Creed, and A
Lawyer's Aspirational Ideals). "As to clients, I shall aspire . . . [t]o fully
informed decision-making. I should: (1) Counsel clients about all forms of
dispute resolution." Ohio S. Ct. App. V.
Texas: "Before the initial conference in a case, counsel shall discuss the
appropriateness of ADR in the litigation with their clients and with opposing
counsel." S.D. Tex. L.R. 20(A)(1).
"Upon order of the Court entered early in the case, the parties shall submit a
report addressing the status of settlement negotiations.., and evaluating whether
alternative dispute resolution is appropriate in the case. Counsel shall certify in
the report that their clients have been informed of the ADR procedures available
in this district." W.D. Tex. L.R. CV-88(a).
California: Attorneys "shall advise" their clients regarding the availability and
effect of ADR options. Sacramento Super. & Municipal Ct. L.R. App. A
(Sacramento County Bar Association Standards of Professional Conduct).
Texas: "I will advise my client regarding the availability of mediation,
arbitration, and other alternative methods of resolving and settling disputes."
Tex. Ct. R. II (The Texas Lawyer?s Creed - A Mandate for Professionalism).
Virginia: "A lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matter and of
communications from another party that may significantly affect settlement or
resolution of the matter." Proposed Va. R.P.C. R. 1.4(c).
"This continuing duty to keep the client informed includes a duty to advise the
client about the availability of dispute resolution processes that might be more
appropriate to the client's goals than the initial process chosen." Proposed Va.
R.P.C. R. 1.4 cmt. la.
THE FOLLOWING STATES HAVE AN IMPLIED ETHICAL DUTY: Kansas, Michigan,
Pennsylvania
Kansas: "When a lawyer's professional judgment indicates ADR is a viable
option, the lawyer should discuss that option with the client, whether or not the
issue is raised by opposing counsel or the court." Pursuant to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct as adopted by Kansas, if opposing counsel or the court
suggests ADR, "the lawyer must advise the [his] client of the benefits and
disadvantages of the ADR techniques proposed." Kansas Bar Association,
Professional Ethics-Advisory Committee, Informal Op. 94-01(1994).
Michigan: "[I]f counsel for the opposing party offers to resolve the pending
dispute through alternative dispute resolution forums, a lawyer is required to
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convey that offer to the client." State Bar of Michigan, Standing Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-262 (1996) (1996 WL 381525).
"A lawyer has an obligation to recommend alternatives to litigation when an
alternative is a reasonable course of action to further the client's interests, or if the
lawyer has any reason to think that the client would find the alternative
desirable." State Bar of Michigan, Standing Committee on Professional and
Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-255 (1996) (1996 WL 381527).
Pennsylvania: Where the opposing attorney offered to "submit the dispute to a
third party neutral to mediate the case," and the plaintiff's attorney "rejected the
offer without discussing the defense request with his client," the attorney failed
his professional responsibility to keep his client informed, unless the client had
previously indicated that such a proposal was not "acceptable." The opinion
further suggests that where additional discovery expenses were incurred, that
"[t]he attorney probably should not charge.., the client if the attorney's refusal
to convey the request for mediation to the client may have been the cause of his or
her incurring the expenses of trial preparation." Pennsylvania Bar Association
Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 90-125
(1991) (1991 WL 787516).
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FIFTY STATE REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY:
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
STATE COURT RULES:
Alabama: "Mediation [non-binding] is mandatory for all parties" in certain
instances, e.g., where all parties agree, upon motion by a party or upon motion of
the court sua sponte. Ala. Code tit. 6, ch. 6 § 6-6-20 (Michie 1997).
Alaska: A court may direct attorneys for the parties to appear before it to
"facilitat[e] the settlement of the case, including the use of alternative dispute
resolution measures." Alaska R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
Arizona: A party may request or a judge may by motion, schedule a pretrial
conference, at which ADR may be considered. Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 16.
Civil rights public accommodation and services statute encourages use of
alternative dispute resolution to resolve disputes arising under the provision.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1492.09 (Michie 1997).
Arkansas: "It is the duty of all trial and appellate courts of this state ... to
encourage the settlement of cases and controversies pending before them by
advising the reference thereof to an appropriate dispute resolution process
agreeable to the parties ..... Ark. Code Ann. § 16-7-202(a) (1997).
"It is the duty of all the elements of government expressed or implied ... and
they are hereby authorized, to use dispute resolution processes in resolving any
and all disputes, cases, or controversies in which they may be directly or
indirectly involved.... " Ark. Code Ann. § 16-7-203 (1997).
Connecticut: Where a pre-trial conference is deemed necessary, both the parties
and the attorneys shall attend and shall consider "alternative dispute resolution
options to trial." Conn. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. § 14-13.
Georgia: "The Georgia Supreme Court encourages every court in Georgia to
consider the use of ADR processes to provide a system of justice which is more
efficient and less costly in human and monetary terms. The Georgia Supreme
Court strongly urges that courts with established mediation programs cooperate
with courts seeking to establish new programs." Ga. Ct. R., ADR IV.
Courts that have adopted a court annexed or court referral ADR program, "shall
make information about ADR options available to all litigants." Ga. Ct. R., App.
A., Rule 1.1.
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Illinois: At the case management conference counsel shall consider "the
advisability of alternative dispute resolution." Ill. S. Ct. R. 218(a)(7).
Certain actions are subject to mandatory arbitration. Ill. S. Ct. R. 86.
Iowa: Among the topics that may be considered at a pre-trial conference is "[t]he
possibility of settlement and imposition of a settlement deadline or the use of
extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." Iowa R. Civ. P. 136(c)(7).
Kentucky: "During any status conference, the Court will address and the parties
shall be prepared to discuss (a) alternative dispute resolution . . . ." Ky. R. Ct.
708(A)(a) (Jefferson Cir.).
Louisiana: The Louisiana Mediation Act encourages attorneys to discuss
mediation options with their clients. La. R.S. 9:4101-4112.
Maryland: Should the court order a scheduling conference, the parties may be
required at such conference to consider "available and appropriate forms of
alternative dispute resolution." Md. R. Civ. P. 2-504.1 (c)(1).
Massachusetts: "The purpose of the Case Management Conference shall be to:
... (3) discuss settlement progress and opportunities for settlement, and offer and
conduct early intervention alternative dispute resolution." Mass. Dist./Mun. Ct.
Civ. Standing Order No. 1-98 § III(B)(3) (Middlesex and Norfolk counties).
Michigan: At a pre-trial conference, "the court and the attorneys for the parties
may consider any matters that will facilitate the fair and expeditious disposition
of the action, including [] whether mediation or some other form of alternative
dispute resolution would be appropriate for the case." Mich. R. Civ. P.
2.401(C)(1)(h).
Minnesota: "All civil cases are subject to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
processes," except provisions made in the rules. Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 114.01.
"After the filing of an action, the parties shall promptly confer regarding case
management issues, including the selection and timing of the ADR process."
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 114.01.
Missouri: If counsel determine after conferring with their clients and other
attorneys "that referral to alternative dispute resolution has no reasonable chance
of being productive, they may opt out by so advising the court, in writing, within
thirty days" of referral to alternative dispute resolution. Mo. S. Ct. R. 17.03.
Montana: "Each party ... shall be required to participate in the mediation
conference." Mont. Ct. R. App. P. 54(e)(8) (mandatory appellate alternative
dispute resolution procedures).
Nebraska: The Dispute Resolution Act provides for mediation and other forms
of dispute resolution through referral to "nonprofit dispute resolution centers"
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which "can make a substantial contribution to the operation and maintenance of the
courts of this state by preserving the court's scarce resources for those disputes which
cannot be resolved by means other than litigation." Neb. R. Civ. P. § 25-2902(8).
Nevada: "Pretrial conferences shall include settlement negotiations." Nev. Ct. R.
9(B).
New Mexico: At the pre-trial conference, participants "may consider and take action
with respect to ... the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures
to resolve the dispute." N.M. Ct. R. Civ. P. 1-016(C)(7).
New York: In the Commercial Division, Supreme Civil Court for New York County,
all parties to commercial actions "shall be obligated[] to attempt in good faith to
achieve early resolution of their dispute by use of appropriate forms of nonbinding
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)." N.Y Ct. R. App. G.
North Dakota: "At any conference under this rule consideration may be given ...
to: (9) Settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute
... (16) Such other matters as may facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of the action." N.D. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(9), -(16).
Oregon: "All civil disputants shall be provided with written information describing
the mediation process, as provided by the Dispute Resolution Commission." Or. Rev.
Stat. § 36-185 (1997).
Rhode Island: "In any action the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:... [s]uch other matters as
may aid in the disposition of the action." R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 16(5).
South Carolina: "[T]he court may in its discretion ... direct the attorneys for the
parties to appear before it for a hearing to consider: ... [s]uch other matters as may
aid the disposition of the action." S.C. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(8).
South Dakota: "Prior to the trial of any action, the court.., shall, after consulting
with the attorneys for the parties. .. enter a scheduling order that limits ... [t]he date
or dates for conference before trial, final pre-trial conference and trial [or] [a]ny other
matters appropriate to the circumstances of the case." S.D. R. Civ. P. § 15-6-16.
Utah: At pretrial management conferences consideration may be had of "matters as
may aid in the orderly disposition of the case." Utah R. Civ. P. 16(a)(6), (b)(11).
Tennessee: Among the topics that may be considered at pre-trial conferences is
"the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures, including
alternative dispute resolution to resolve the dispute." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 16.03(7).
Vermont: "In any action, the court may ... direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before it for a conference to consider... [s]uch other matters as may aid in
the disposition of the action." Vt. R. Civ. P. 16(6).
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Virginia: "The court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before it for a conference to consider... [sluch other matters as may aid the
disposition of the action." Va. S. Ct. R. 4:13(8).
Wyoming: At the pre-trial conference, among the subjects that may be considered
is the use of alternative dispute resolution procedures. Wy. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
FEDERAL DISTRICT LOCAL COURT RULES:
Alabama: Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan "aims to encourage the use of ADR
in part by granting the parties discretion to decide to employ any number of ADR
processes available through private means." M.D. Ala. L.R. 16. 1(c).
A judge may refer the parties as part of the scheduling order to engage in one of the
forms of ADR, as provided for in the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction
Plan. The "court encourages litigants to resolve their disputes prior to trial through
a program of voluntary mediation." Bankr. N.D. Ala. L.R. 9019-2; see also M.D.
Ala. L.R. 16.2.
California: Section VIII(B) of the Case Management Pilot Program provides that
within one hundred days of the filing of the complaint, trial counsel "shall meet and
confer" regarding "alternative dispute resolution procedures." N.D. Ca. G.O. 34.
"Counsel and client shall certify that both have:
(1) Read the brochure entitled Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Northern
District of California;
(2) Discussed the available dispute resolution options provided by the court
and private entities; and
(3) Considered whether their case might benefit from any of the available
dispute resolution options.? N.D. Ca. L.R. 16-12(a).
Colorado: Section I of the Civil Justice Reform Act Expense and Delay
Reduction Plan provides that the attorneys "shall" attend the conference "pre-
pared to address all matters related to discovery, motions, settlement conferences,
and all other aspects of the litigation." D. Colo. L.R. 29.1. Further, "[t]he judicial
officer presiding will discuss alternative dispute resolution possibilities." Id.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado has adopted the Colorado
Rules of Professional Conduct. D. Colo. L.R. 83.6.
Delaware: "Matters to be considered at the Rule 16(b) conference will include:
... (4) whether the matter could be resolved by voluntary mediation or binding
arbitration." D. Del. R. 16.2(b)(4).
District of Columbia: At the meeting required in accordance with Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the parties "shall discuss ... [w]hether the case
could benefit from the Court's alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures."
D.D.C. Civ. R. 206(c)(5).
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Florida: Attorneys for the parties "shall" be required to meet and "[d]iscuss the
possibilities for prompt settlement or resolution of the matter, and whether mediation
or the use of an other alternative dispute resolution process might be helpful in that
regard." N.D. Fla. L.R. § 6(F) (Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan).
Hawaii: All parties "shall attend in person or by counsel" the pre-trial scheduling
conference, "and shall be prepared to discuss ... [a]ppropriateness of special
procedures such as ... reference ... to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation alternative dispute procedures." D. Haw. L.R. 253-3(a)(9).
Idaho: Prior to the scheduling conference "attorneys will be required to
communicate between themselves with respect to [the c]onsideration of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution." D. Idaho L.R. 16.1 (a)(8).
Indiana: "Counsel for the parties should appear at an initial pretrial conference
prepared to express themselves effectively with respect to ... [w]hether there is a
probability of disposing of the case through... mediation or alternative dispute
resolution methods." N.D. Ind. L.R. 16.1 (d)(11).
Kansas: At the final pretrial conference, the feasibility of mediation, arbitration
or other alternative methods of dispute resolution shall be considered. D. Kan. Ct.
R. 16.1(b)(10).
Louisiana: Counsel shall attend the scheduling conference, at which they are to
come "fully prepared" to "discuss other alternatives available to assist the
litigants in resolving their dispute, including.., mediation or arbitration." W.D.
La. R. § 1l(b)(4) (Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan).
Maine: On the "standard track" for purposes of case management, counsel are to
"confer and discuss" prior to the scheduling conference, regarding "the various
alternative dispute resolution options." The agenda for the scheduling conference
includes "ADR options." Further, "[d]uring the conference the judicial officer
shall be aggressive in exploring the advisability and utility of ADR." D. Me. L.R.
16.3(B)(3) et seq.
Mississippi: Counsel are to meet and discuss "ADR recommendations" prior to
the case management conference. D. Miss. R. § 3(I)(A) (Expense and Delay
Reduction Plan).
Montana: "Every party shall file a Preliminary Pretrial Statement" that shall
address the "feasibility [of] invoking alternative dispute resolution procedures."
D. Mont. Ct. Civ. R. 235-1.
New Hampshire: "ADR will be discussed at the preliminary pretrial confer-
ence." D. N.H. L.R. 53.1(a).
New Jersey: "At or after the initial conference, the Magistrate Judge shall, after
consultation with counsel, enter a scheduling order which may include, but not
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need be limited to the following: ... any designation of the case for arbitration."
D. N.J. L. Civ. R. 16.1(b)(1)(F).
New York: As part of the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan for the
U.S. District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, the court
and counsel "shall address .. the feasibility of settlement or alternative dispute
resolution" at the case management conference. S. & E.D.N.Y. R., App. H(5)(f).
North Carolina: The "'Initial Attorneys Conference' ("IAC") is the first
required conference in which counsel for all parties shall confer. During this
conference counsel shall discuss and agree upon, if possible, the following
matters: ... whether the case is suitable for reference to ADR." W.D. N.C. R.
I(B)(3) (Civil Justice Reform Act Plan).
Ohio: Under the Differentiated Case Management system, among the issues that
shall be determined at a case management conference is "whether the case is
suitable for reference to an ADR program." N.D. Ohio L.R. 16.1.
Oklahoma: Prior to the case management conference, counsel "shall confer and
discuss ... [w]hether a settlement conference or other alternative dispute
resolution mechanism should be employed." N.D. Okla. L.R. 16.1 (C)(13).
Pennsylvania: At the second pre-trial conference, the parties shall submit a plan
for the preparation for trial, and shall include deadlines for events such as "any
proposed use of alternative dispute resolution procedures." E.D. Pa. L.R. § 3:02
et seq. (Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan).
Texas: "Prior to the Management Conference, attorneys for each party shall
make the required disclosures ... and shall have conferred with the other
attorneys in the action concerning ... alternative dispute resolution." E.D. Tex.
L.R. CV-16(a)(2), -(c).
Washington: At the scheduling conference, "counsel shall ... state whether
there is a significant possibility that early and inexpensive resolution of the case
would be fostered by any alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") procedure."
W.D. Wash. R. 16(a).
West Virginia: Prior to the scheduling conference the parties "shall" meet to
"consider alternative dispute resolution processes." S.D. W. Va. R. 2.01(b)(4).
Wisconsin: At the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 16 conference "the
judicial officer shall determine whether a case is an appropriate one in which to
invoke .. . the referral of the case for ... alternative dispute resolution." E.D.
Wis. Ct. R. 7.
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